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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.
Appellate Court No. 20030574-CA

DAVID J. ORR,
Defendant/Appellant.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD BE BOUND BY THE DATE STAMP
ON THE FILING OF THE PROGRESS/VIOLATION REPORT AS A
MATTER OF LAW.
It is significant that the State concedes in its Appellee's Brief that". .. AP&P had
until May 12, 2003 to file a violation report." Appellee Br. 12. Defendant argued in his
opening brief that the date stamp on the official Progress/Violation Report (attached as
Add. 1 herein) filed by Agent Egelund showed that it was not formally filed with the
Court until May 13, 2003. However, Appellee argues in its responsive brief that the date
it was actually filed is a question of fact and such question of fact will not be reversed
absent clear error. Appellee Br. 12. Defendant Orr maintains that a date of actual filing
with the Court is determined as a matter of law based upon the clerk of the court's datestamp and the lower court's decision is considered for legal correctness. State v. Parker,

936 P.2d 1118 (Utah App. 1997) (attached as Add. 2 herein); State v. Palmer, 111 P.2d
521 (Utah App. 1989). Those cases, at least indirectly, stand for the proposition that the
official date-stamp placed on a filed document will govern as a matter of law. In Parker,
the Utah Court of Appeals noted:
The trial court entered its judgment on October 25, 1994. Defendant dated
his notice of appeal November 18, 1994, and certified that he mailed the
notice through the prison mail on November 19, 1994. The district court
clerk did not date stamp his notice of appeal until nine days later November
28, 1994. With the notice of appeal, defendant included a Motion for
Extension dated November 19, 1994, which also was date stamped on
November 28th, but the trial court never acted on the motion.. . . This court
dismissed defendant's appeal in an unpublished memorandum decision on
October 19, 1995, concluding this court lacked jurisdiction to extend the
time for filing a notice of appeal.
Defendant then filed a petition for rehearing, which the court granted.

(W)e affirm our prior ruling dismissing defendant's appeal for lack of
jurisdiction.
936 P.2d at 1119, 1122. (See additional discussion infra p. 4, 5).
Clearly, the Utah Court of Appeals in Parker believed that the date-stamp was the
critical date on which the filing of a document will be governed as a matter of law. This
is not the date any third person places upon the document, but the date-stamp placed on
the document by a court clerk's office itself. See also State v. Palmer, 111 P.2d at 521523.'

1

"We conclude that the notice of appeal was not timely filed under any plausible
interpretation of our rules." 777 P.2d at 522.
2

The case of In re K.G. 2002, UT App. 3, 2002 WL 23812 (January 4, 2002) also
stands for the proposition that the date-stamp placed upon a document by the clerk's
office is the date upon which the document was actually filed as a matter of law. The
State attempts to distinguish the instant case by suggesting that in the K.G. case "the
notice of appeal bore one date stamp that showed the notice of appeal was untimely
filed." Appellee Br. 15. The attempted distinction is not factually appropriate in the
instant case. The State argues that in the instant case "the violation report reflected two
dates: (1) an electronic date-stamp showing that the report was timely; and (2) a handwritten change suggesting that the report was untimely." Id. However, a review of the
Progress/Violation Report in the instant case (Add. 1) and the document entitled
"Affidavit in Support of Order to Show Cause" and attached as Add. 2 to Appellant's
opening brief shows that only one date-stamp appears. While there may be a handwritten change stating it was filed on May 13, 2003, that is the only date-stamp that
appears on the face of the violation report.
The trial judge opined from the bench that the change was probably made by his
clerk on the date that she officially filed the document, and no testimony or evidence
under oath was taken to establish that fact in the Order to Show Cause hearing (R. 481, p.
26,1. 24, 25, p. 27,1. 1-11, p. 28,1. 6-20, p. 29,1. 1-5). Under the circumstances of the
instant case then, there can be no distinction from the holding in the case of In re KG.,

3

nor this case. The single date-stamp placed on the document by the clerk of the Court
must prevail, as the Utah Court of Appeals held in the case of In re K.G., supra at *1. 2
In addition, the State quotes Raiser v Buirley, 2002 UT App. 277, 54 P.3d 650
(Utah App. 2002) (per curiam) as standing for the proposition that the Court could
consider extrinsic evidence under "similar circumstances." Appellee Br. 15. However,
what the State fails to note is that the Raiser case was exceptional and a clear aberration
from the normal rule where all courts are bound by the date-stamp on a filed document.
In that case, the Utah Court of Appeals relied upon the case ofIn re M.S., 781 P.2d 1287
(Utah Ct. App. 1989) (per curiam) for its initial dismissal of an appeal for lack of
jurisdiction based upon an untimely notice of appeal where it had held that an "appellate
court is 'bound by the filing date indicated on the notice of appeal transmitted to it by the
trial court.' Id. at 1288" Id. at ^[2. Upon further review, this panel of the Utah Court of
Appeals reversed its judgment based upon the fact that a timely filing of a notice of
appeal had earlier been made although the court had rejected it for failure to timely pay
the filing fee. The Court noted as follows:
Under the unique circumstances of this case, we deem the notice of
appeal to have been filed on September 20, 2001, when it was first accepted
and date-stamped by the district court clerk. The delay of one week in

2

Although Agent Egelund testified he punched the date-stamp on the report
himself at the clerk's office, the State cites no authority allowing anyone other than the
clerk of the Court to officially date-stamp a filed document. Allowing anyone else to do
so and be recognized would be to open up the system to confusion and potential abuse, as
in the instant case.
4

rejecting the notice of appeal and returning it to Raiser based upon the
apparent failure to tender an acceptable filing fee was ineffective because
the timely notice of appeal had been accepted as "filed" by the clerk.
To deem the acceptance revokable would work an injustice because Raiser
could reasonably rely upon either acceptance of the notice of appeal or its
prompt rejection.
Id. at ^f9. (Emphasis added).
What was clear from the court's decision in that case was that a set of "unique
circumstances" had been presented to it, but those circumstances involved a clear and
timely filing and acceptance as filed by the clerk which was then later rejected. The
situation is quite different in the instant case. There is no date on the Progress/Violation
Report except May 13, 2003. There was not a rejection of the document and return to the
filer based upon some extrinsic matter such as payment of a fee. It is significant to note
that the court in Raiser ruled the way it did because the clerk's office had clearly accepted
a timely notice of appeal as "filed" on a prior occasion and then later rejected it.
Defendant suggests that this case is not inapposite as does the State, but rather it is
support for the proposition that the date-stamp will be accepted by the court as a matter of
law as the date an item is filed.
Furthermore, the Raiser case does not stand for the proposition that the court's
opinion in that case created a circumstance where the court was to consider the question
of the official filing of the document as a matter of fact and not law. Therefore, the
argument made by the State that "Defendant has not demonstrated the trial court's finding
that the report was timely filed on May 9th was clearly erroneous" is an incorrect
5

statement of the standard of review and must be disregarded by this Court. Furthermore,
the Court is asked to specifically review the case of State v. Parker, supra (Add. 2) which
makes clear that even under circumstances where the situation seems unfair, the datestamp by the clerk's office is the official "filing" of the court as a matter of law for
jurisdictional purposes. In that case, the trial court had entered a judgment on
Defendant's guilty plea on October 25, 1994. Defendant dated his notice of appeal
November 18, 1994, clearly within the 30 day filing requirement, and certified that he
mailed the notice through the prison mail on November 19, 1994. The district court clerk
did not date-stamp his notice of appeal until nine days later - November 28, 1994. Id. at
1118. The Court of Appeals noted that".. . the reasoning of Houston {Houston v. Lack,
487 US 266, 108 S.Ct. 2379, 101 L.Ed.2d 245 (1988)) and the policies underlying the
prison delivery rule are compelling. . . . In holding the filing was timely, the Houston
court emphasized that an incarcerated pro se defendant's lack of control over the filing of
his or her notice of appeal is unique. .. . We understand why many of our sister states
have decided to adopt Houston's interpretation of the federal rules to their own state rules
of procedure .. ." Id at 1120, 1121.
Despite its apparent feeling that there were unfair circumstances in Parker, the
Court of Appeals declined to apply the prison delivery rule to correct what it seemed to be
admitting was an injustice and felt that it was up to the Supreme Court, which had the
ultimate authority for drafting Rules of Appellate Procedure, to draft the prison delivery

6

rule and correct this particular wrong. Id. at 1122. The date-stamp was official as a
matter of law.
It is Defendant Orr's argument that if this issue is to be viewed as a matter of law,
there can be no question that the Progress/Violation Report was not filed until May 13,
2003, one day after the State admits Defendant's probation terminated by operation of
law. If such was the case, then the State's argument regarding Utah Code Ann. § 77-181(1 l)(b) tolling the running of the probation period upon the filing of a violation report is
not valid and should be rejected by this Court in this case. The clerk of the court made a
handwritten change to reflect the official date filed, despite the fact that it may have been
punched with a date-stamp earlier by a third person who was not an official court clerk,
Agent Egelund. It is the official date entered for filing by the clerk of the court, not the
probation agent which should govern here.3

3

This Court is asked to take judicial notice of the Third District Court's formal
official docketing record for the instant case which reflects the officially filed date for the
Progress/Violation Report and Affidavit in Support of Order to Show Cause as May 13,
2003. (Add. 6, p. 13).
7

POINT II
DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW UNDER
BOTH THE UTAH AND UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS WAS
VIOLATED BECAUSE HE WAS NOT TIMELY SERVED WITH
NOTICE THAT THE STATE WAS ATTEMPTING TO REVOKE,
MODIFY OR EXTEND HIS PROBATION.
In his opening brief, Defendant Orr argued that his probation had ended by
operation of law on May 12, 2003 and the Court lost jurisdiction over him at that time
because he was not provided notice of the Court's action until May 19, 2003. Appellant
cited, among others, the case of State v. Rawlings, 893 P.2d 1063 (Utah App. 1995)
(attached as Add. 3) for this proposition. In its responsive brief, the State does not deny
that Defendant was not provided formal notice of the Order to Show Cause in the trial
judge's court until May 19, 2003, nor that the trial judge did not sign the Order to Show
Cause until May 13, 2003, one day after Defendant's probation terminated by operation
of law. See Add. 5.
Instead, the State attempts to distinguish the Rawlings case by suggesting the case
holding, that jurisdiction to extend probation depended upon service before expiration of
the probation period, was actually decided upon statutory grounds alone, and not by the
constitutional concept of due process of law; and further, that the statute interpreted was
prior to the tolling provision of 11(b) and so should not be used as precedent in the instant
case. The State's assertion in this regard is incorrect and misleading. Although it is true
that the court in Rawlings interpreted the 1985 provision of Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1,

8

and the tolling provision 11(b) was not passed until 1989, it is simply not true that the
concept of due process of law was not the determining factor, or at least the codetermining factor, in the Rawlings case.
In Rawlings, the Utah Court of Appeals cited the earlier case of Smith v. Cook, 803
P.2d 788 (Utah 1990) as precedent and quoted extensively from that opinion.4 Among the
quotations the Rawlings court cited from that opinion was the following:
Furthermore, the court felt that its holding was appropriate because it
"guarantee(d) the fundamental fairness embodied in the due process clause
of the United States Constitution (which) entitle(s) probationers to written
notice of the accusations against them." Id. at 795. (parenthetical words
and letters in original).
Rawlings at 1068.
Clearly then, the Utah Court of Appeals found that the due process clause of the United
States Constitution was violated where petitioner did not receive written notice of the
accusation against him prior to the date of expiration of the defendant's probation in both
Smith and Rawlings.
The State's responsive brief, in attempting to reach for precedent which would
cause this Court to avoid a due process analysis in the instant case, further makes the
statement that "(N)othing i n the Smith opinion remotely suggests that due process
requires notice, in addition to filing a report, during the probation period . . .". Appellee

4

"While Smith involved statutory prerequisites to commencement of a probation
revocation proceeding, the same analysis is applicable to statutory prerequisites to
commencement of probation extension proceedings...." (Italics in original).
9

Br. 18. But, as noted above and as quoted in the later Rawlings case, the Utah Supreme
Court in Smith v. Cook did indeed address directly "the fundamental fairness embodied in
the due process clause of the United States Constitution (which) entitle(s) probationers to
written notice of the accusations against them." Smith at 795. In fact, in a footnote, the
Smith court cited the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Gagnon v. Scarpelli,
411 U.S. 778, 786, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 1761-62, 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973) and its own earlier
decision in the case of State v. Cowdell, 626 P.2d at 488 (Utah 1981) for this due process
proposition.
The Cowdell case is particularly instructive and makes the due process analysis in
Smith v. Cook (and later in State v. Rawlings) particularly relevant. In Cowdell, the Utah
Supreme Court specifically held as follows:
The decision of a trial court to modify or revoke a probation is basically a
discretionary matter, § 77-18-1, U.CA., (1953 as amended). Nevertheless,
in revoking a probation, a court may not ignore fundamental precepts of
fairness protected by the due process clause....
626P.2dat488.
Although the Cowdell case involved a revocation as opposed to an extension of
probation, the principle of due process remains the same. In Smith v. Cook, supra, the
Supreme Court of Utah noted "(T)he general nature of probation places significant
restrictions on the liberty of the person placed on probation. The penal quality of
probation is also clear from § 77-18-l(4)(Supp. 1981), which states thait as a condition of
probation the trial court can impose fines, require restitution, and impose jail sentences...
10

." Id. at 793. The Smith court also noted in its holding as quoted previously: "(W)e hold
that in situations where the probationer is not actively avoiding supervision, in order for
a trial court to retain its authority over the probationer beyond the period of
probation, the probationer must be served with an order to show cause within the
probationary period," Id. at 796. (Emphasis added).
Although the State would have this Court believe that Smith and Rawlings were
not decided on due process grounds, clearly this Court can see otherwise. The State may
also argue that the only thing that matters, even if due process is involved, is that such
constitutional rights under both the Utah and United States Constitution should only be
applied where there is a danger of revocation of probation rather than extension or
modification. However, this argument completely overlooks the requirements of U.C.A.
§ 77-18-1 (as amended 2000) which specifically states "(12)(a)(i) probation may not be
modified or extended except upon waiver of a hearing by the probationer or upon a
hearing and a finding in court that the probationer has violated the conditions of
probation." (emphasis supplied).
In State v. Call, cited in Appellant's opening brief (Add. 4), the Utah Supreme
Court was called upon to decide a case of extension of probation. After citing State v.
Green, 757 P.2d 462 (Utah 1988) and Smith v. Cook, supra, the Utah Supreme Court
held:
These cases instruct that if it is the intent of the state to extend the
probationary period beyond its original term, the state must take definitive
11

action to extend the term before the expiration date, and the probationer
must be given notice of that intent. Otherwise the probationer is left in a
state of uncertainty, not knowing whether to continue to observe the terms
of his probation.
Call, 1999 UT 42, 980 P.2d 201 at 1fl 1. (Emphasis added).
The court specifically noted that the State of Utah argued that § 77-18-1 (Supp. 1996)
(1 l)(b) should be determinative of the case. However, the Utah Supreme Court did not
determine that (1 l)(b) was determinative of the case but found that because the probation
officer had approached Call well in advance of the termination date and he signed a
waiver of a right to hearing and agreed to an extension of his probation for one more year,
Call ". . . received actual notice that his term of probation would not expire at the
conclusion of the statutory 36 month period." Id. at ^[11. Therefore, it must be concluded
that the Utah Supreme Court continues to affirm its prior holdings in Smith and Rawlings
that a probationer must be served with a notice of his probation violation and upcoming
court appearance prior to the expiration of his probation period before his right to due
process of law has been effectively observed by a trial court.
It is understandable why the State does not want this Court to engage in a due
process analysis in the instant case. This is because the due process holdings of Smith,
Rawlings, Call and State v. Grate, 947 P.2d 1161 (Utah App. 1997) (quoted in
Appellant's opening brief) all clearly stand for the proposition that this Court and the
Utah Supreme Court have always engaged in a due process analysis when looking at the

12

issue of a defendant receiving proper notice of probation violation proceedings. In the
case of State v. Grate, the Utah Court of Appeals held:
Finally, our conclusion that the charging of a probation violation requires
service of notice on a probationer of the actual accusations and of the need
to prepare a defense not only removes the "danger of placing (probationers)
in a state of perpetual limbo" which so concerned our Supreme Court in
Green and Smith, but "is also in accord with the decisions of th(at) court, as
well as the United States Supreme Court, holding that the guarantees of
fundamental fairness embodied in the due process clause of the United
States Constitution entitle probationers to written notice of the
accusations against them prior to their revocation hearings." Smith,
803 P.2d at 795 (footnote omitted).
947 P.2d at 1167. (Emphasis added).
Despite the State's incorrect assertions otherwise, there simply can be no question that
both this Court and the Utah Supreme Court have engaged in a significant due process
analysis when it relates to the question of notice to probationers of the state's intent to
extend, modify or revoke probation.
The State further glosses over and attempts to disregard the fact that, the trial judge
in this matter did not sign the Order to Show Cause until May 13, 2003, one day after the
State admits Defendant's probation would have terminated by operation of law. (See
Add. 5 herein). In State v. Raw lings, the Utah Supreme Court in reviewing facts found in
Smith v. Cook, supra, stated as follows:
. . . Three months before his probation expired, the plaintiff was again
arrested and charged with two counts of sexual abuse of a child and sodomy
upon a child. As a result of this arrest, an incident report and affidavit to
show cause why the plaintiffs probation should not be revoked were filed
with the court before the expiration of the defendant's probation. However

n

the court did not order the plaintiff to show cause why his probation
should not be revoked until after the plaintiffs original term of
probation had expired. Thus the plaintiff was first given notice of the
probation revocation proceedings after his probation had expired. . ..
893 P.2d at 1067, 1068 citing Smith 803 P.2d at 789. (Emphasis added).
The Smith court had gone on with its due process analysis and indicated that the
probationer's right to written notice of the accusations against him prior to the
termination of the probation period by operation of law was "guarantee(d) (by)
fundamental fairness embodied in the due process clause of the United States
Constitution. ..". 803 P.2d at 795.
This Court is asked to reject the State's inappropriate and misleading argument
suggesting that the Rawlings and Smith cases did not involve a due process analysis; and
in this case, where the Judge didn't even sign the Order to Show Cause until one day after
Defendant Orr's probation period terminated, find that Defendant Orr was denied his
Utah and U.S. Constitutional rights to due process of law where he was served with the
Judge's Order seven days after his probation terminated by operation of law.
The State cites the case of State v. Reedy as being "the only case to directly address
the effect of subsection 11(b)" and further claims that case expressly rejected Defendant's
argument herein. Appellee Br. 17.5 The State goes on to challenge Defendant's argument
in his opening brief that Reedy was not dispositive of the instant matter due to the fact

5

Of course the state completely overlooks and/or intentionally disregards State v.
Call, supra p. 10, 11 in boldly making this statement.
;14

that the Court found that defendant had "made service impracticable since he left Utah
without permission and was in California when he claims he should have been served."
Defendant noted in his opening brief "Because this case was decided several months prior
to the Grate case, and because it is clear that defendant had left the jurisdiction and could
not be served with the court's proposed action violating his probation, Defendant
maintains that this case is inapposite and does not affect the dismissal requested by him.
Reedy's due process rights were essentially waived by his evasion of supervision and
leaving the state so he could not be located to be served. No such facts exist in the instant
case. If it were otherwise, the Grate court surely would have relied on Reedy as
precedent. Reedy was decided April 17, 1997 and Grate was decided October 30, 1997."
Appellant Br. 21, n. 4.
Appellee states "a fair reading of Reedy, however, reveals that this observation
was not necessary to the Court's decision, but was dicta." Appellant Br. at 20. Defendant
asserts that Appellee's analysis of Reedy is not correct. Defendant Orr continues to
maintain that a "fair" reading of Reedy suggests that the issue of Reedy having evaded
supervision and left the state was not dicta. Rather, Defendant Orr maintains that the
appellate court in Reedy understood that due process and fundamental fairness were clear
issues in the matter, as it discussed later in the Grate case. The court in Reedy did not
need to become involved in an extensive due process analysis due to the fact that
defendant had made service impracticable since he left Utah without permission and was

15

in California when he claims he should have been served. The court went on to review
Smith v. Cook and the Utah Supreme Court's opinion therein. The Reedy court did not
out of hand reject the Smith analysis simply on the basis that (1 l)(b) had not yet been
enacted when the Smith court was considering the facts of that case, but cited the
distinction made by the Smith court, then specifically stated:
. . . the Smith court concluded that the trial court lost jurisdiction to revoke
probation because Smith was not served with notice of the revocation
proceedings within the probation period. Id. at 795-796. The court noted
that the rule might be different in a situation where a probationer avoided
service or evaded supervision . . . Reedy evaded supervision by leaving
Utah and failing to check in with probation authorities; thus, even under the
Smith analysis, it would not be necessary to serve him during the probation
period.
937P.2datl53.
Although the Reedy court does not specifically mention due process, it is clear
from the foregoing and its entire review of the Smith case that it was referring to the due
process analysis in the Smith case. Although the State would like this Court to ignore
virtually the entire Reedy opinion and read it as simply holding that § 77-18-1(1 l)(b) is
dispositive of the matter and nothing further need be said, the State's analysis of Reedy is
incorrect and inappropriate. Defendant urges the Court to consider that the court in Reedy
would have had to come to a different conclusion had the Defendant not evaded
supervision and not been available to be served prior to the time of termination of
probation based upon its analysis in the Grate case decided just six months later.

16

In the instant case, there is no evidence whatsoever nor any argument by the State
either below or on appeal that Defendant Orr was not available to be served. Indeed,
Defendant Orr's probation officer specifically testified that the only reason he waited
until May 19, 2003, some seven days after Defendant's probation would have terminated
by operation of law even by the State's admission, was because "(T)hat w a s the soonest I
was going to see him." Mr. Egelund admitted that he did not make any extra effort to
notify Defendant Orr of the Order to Show Cause hearing and the possibility that the
Court would revoke, extend or modify his probation until May 19, 2003. (R. 481, p. 22,1.
8-20).6
The State also correctly notes that Defendant relies upon State v. Call, supra (Add.
4) for the proposition that (1 l)(b) does not affect a Defendant's right to notice and thus
due process of law. However, the State rejects Defendant's argument and suggests that
the Call Court's reliance on Green and Smith should be disregarded because "Neither
case rested on due process concerns." Appellee Br. 23. Defendant has already rebutted
the allegation that Smith did not rest on due process concerns and again notes to the Court
the extent to which the State has gone to provide this misleading analysis to the Court.

6

The Court is reminded here, as stated in Defendant's opening brief at 14, that the
probation officer testified below he notified Defendant he was recommending termination
of the probation to the trial judge and allowing restitution to be handled by the civil
process (R. 481, p. 22,1. 21-25, p. 23,1. 1-14). This was the only notice received by
Defendant Orr until May 19, 2003, seven days after his probation ended by operation of
law.
17

Although the State is correct that the court in Call did not explicitly decide that case on
due process concerns, what it fails to note is that the statement made by the court:
(T)hese cases instruct that if it is the intent of the state to extend 1he
probationary period beyond its original term, the state must take definitive
action to extend the term before the expiration date and the probationer
must be given notice of that intent. Otherwise the probationer is left in a
state of uncertainty not knowing whether to continue to observe the terms of
his probation.. . .
clearly must have been made based upon the due process analysis of the Smith and Green
cases. Call at ^Jl 1. (emphasis added). If such was not the case, why would the Utah
Supreme Court have made such a blanket statement in 1999 analyzing a case which
clearly occurred after (1 l)(b) was enacted in 1989, ten years earlier and was even cited by
the court in its decision? See Call at ^[8. Perhaps the State would like to argue that our
Supreme Court simply overlooked (1 l)(b), but such a conclusion would not be justified
by the analysis contained therein. Defendant maintains that our Supreme Court has
reiterated as late as 1999 that despite § 77-18-1(1 l)(a), two things must occur prior to the
expiration date of a defendant's original probation term, and they are (1) the state must
take definitive action to extend the term before the expiration date and (2) the probationer
must be given notice of that intent before the expiration date. To suggest that the second
prong of this statement is anything other than an opinion couched with a due process
foundation as the State does in its responsive brief is to misunderstand and misread the
prior decisions of this Court in Cowdell, Grate, Smith v. Cook and, as the court in State v.
Call noted, State v. Green. Call at ^fl 1.
48

Defendant respectfully requests that this Court find that his right to due process of
law under both the Utah and U.S. Constitutions were violated and the Court lost
jurisdiction over him when the State failed to serve him with the Order to Show Cause for
probation violation, extension or modification prior to the termination of his probation by
operation of law.
POINT III
REPLY TO STATE'S RESPONSE IN POINT'S II AND III OF ITS
BRIEF.
The State argues in Point II of its responsive brief that a court has authority to
extend probation upon a finding that the probationer has not completed the terms of his
probation, including fully paying court-ordered restitution. While Defendant in his
opening brief and herein does not deny that a court has such authority, the real issue is
whether or not the state is required to give the Defendant due process notice before the
termination of the probation period in order to extend or modify, as well as revoke
probation. Defendant cited the case of State v. Hodges, 798 P.2d 270 (Utah App. 1990)
in arguing that his probation could be extended only if his failure to pay restitution was
willful. Although the State correctly notes that the Hodges court involved a revocation of
probation as opposed to an extension of probation, Utah law makes clear that probation
may not be modified or extended except upon a waiver of a hearing by the probationer
or upon a hearing and finding in court probationer had violated the conditions of
probation. Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(12)(a)(i) (Supp. 2000). However, it is Defendant's
19

argument that the Court must find that the violation referred to in that statute was a
"willful" violation.
The State's assertion that the Hodges case involved a revocation of probation is
correct as far as it goes; but it is Defendant's position that Hodges stands for the
proposition that where the alleged violation is a failure to pay a fine and/or restitution, the
sentencing court must still find that probationer willfully violated the terms and
conditions of his probation in order to extend, modify or revoke that probation. Where, as
here, "(T)he defendant has made consistent monthly payments of $1,000.00 towards
restitution", the State fails to show any willful violation of the Court's restitution order.
See Progress/Violation Report, Add. 1, second page under the heading "Restitution."
In State v. Peterson, 869 P.2d 989, 991 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) the Utah Court of
Appeals specifically indicated that in the context of an alleged failure to pay restitution
(i.e. as grounds for revocation/modification of probation), "a finding of wilfulness merely
requires a finding that the probationer did not make bona fide efforts to meet the
conditions of his probation." No such finding was made by the trial judge in the instant
matter. Without finding both a violation and wilfulness (i.e. the absence ofbona fide
efforts to pay restitution), the District Court had no basis for ordering an extension of his
probation, even if this Court rules the District Court still had jurisdiction of Defendant
Orr.
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In Point III of its brief, the State admits that the trial court exceeded its authoni) in
extending the Ddendani s pn 'b.uion lor ten years (seven years with credit for the three
years previousl} sei /ed & it! IC 1 it • • iolatioi i) 1 1 le State at gi les the • i i lattei si: 101 lie • e
• rhile

remanded for the trial court to amend its Order to extend probation lo V ;M ^r

~ * \ 'idant appreciates the State's concession in liu- mai;.[ ; I )e!endant >nll argues liiat Lis
due process of law under both the Utah and United States Constiti itions were
lul liCL.i- - - its termination i

lale legal idluih lo t:\liini Ins |ni>baliuii niu 1 nol mat".

r^ration of law; and he was denied in> !: J i - • •.

. ..

• )
^-t

being served prior to his probation's termination by operation of law. I lowever, die
Defendant agrees that the very least this Court ought to do is remand the case for the
Defendai it to be r esei ltei iced for 36 i i 101 ltl is of pi obation be ginni i iglv la> 12, 20 -».
CONCLUSION
Defendant urges this Court to consider ;ju; violation of his rights to due process of
law under the circumstances of this case. I le was not afforded "fundamental fairness" in
at t i,€ w as essei itiall> lead tc belie\ e b> his pr obatioi l off icei , a s at gue< 1 ii 11 lis

.-; !..„

brief and not disputed by the State, that 11 i pr* >bni ior. u»- :d !v terminate d ,i« . * • *.•
2003. He was not served with notice uniil Max i*>. Min_- ot'lhc iaci thai tlie Court had
decided to take further action against him.

21

For these and the other reasons outlined in Appellant's opening brief and this reply
brief, it is respectflilly requested that this Court order that Defendant be released from the
custody of the trial court, with his probation having been terminated by operation of law.
Dated this JtL

da

Y of Jfi& U

2004.
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C.

gfcM^.

LARRlfR. KELLER
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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STATE OF UT
UMH I PROBATION A

n -^ ^ ffl *
PROTECTED
"'. MT LAKE roUhTY"
PROGRESS/VIOLATION REPORT
BfcPfcfTY CLERK
) : 3RD D I S T R I C T -

R E G A R D I N G : ORR, David Jay

Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County, Utah.
I IN

linU

| miolhyR II mson

IOM

Salt Lake AP&P

C A S E NO.- 001W2772
( H I T INS*. 1 ( il Lstate Biokei A»ent Willi l > il
I i n nse, 3rd Degree Felony,
iecuulies Fraud, 3rd Degree Felony

A T E : 05/09/2003

nHMNDM? 1/ 1 "JM '

J O B A T I O N D A T E : 05/12/2000

ADDRESS: 5449 W SUNTREE (3350 S ) AVE,
WFST V AT LFY CITY T TT 841 ?0

Mi'lM M I M D V f E : U5/11/2UU3

EMPLOYMENT: Mca-Mark/Consult/Agent
Y2 Marketing,
1801 North Hampton //120,
DesofoTX 75115

E F E N S E A T T Y : Larry K Keller
)MMENTS:
05/12/2000, the defendant was placed on probation with the following; conditions:
Commit no further violations and/or crimes.
Obtain and maintain lawful, verifiable, full-tune employment.
Submit truthful and detailed financial income reports to AP&P as diircted
Pay fine in the amount of $ 1850 00, payable to the Court.
That the defendant avoid all activities involving investments or other tmancial transactions using assets
belonging to persons outside of his immediate family or requiring professional hVeri< inp
Serve 180 days in the Salt Lake County Jail, commencing on 05/12/00, with no uulil iui time served.
Have no contact with victims.
Pay restitution, in an amount to be determined, at a rate of $1000 per month or 25% of monthly income.
LOBATIONUPDA1L: Ihedil I t li i > been niiiutal lakrally loi Conspiiaiy io ( tiiiiuit J1 laii
aud, Wire Freud and Conspii in Io Detraud The United Stales, 18 U S.C. 371. Theit is lour othei u>
fendants indicted with the d f 1 int According to the indictment, the latest date the defendant is
arged is in February 200(1 The defendant was convicted of his probation case in March 2000 and placed
probation in May 2000, thus, the new federal charge occurred before the defendant's current Third
strict probation case.

HE; OKR, David Jay

-2-

FINES/FEES: The defendant has paid $600 of the $1,850 court fine. He is presently overdue $150 on
supervision fees. The Department Of Corrections accounting department has not correctly distributed the
money received by the defendant He has paid $34,553.20 on this case for restitution and fines.
RESTITUTION: The defendant has made consistent monthly payments of $1,000 towards restitution.
After two Restitution Hearings, Dr. Tom Million is to be paid $255,504. Additionally, Kurt Ostler is owed
$30,000, Jeff Ostler $30,000 and Craig Grenier $50,000.
SUMMARY: The defendant has not been found in any violation of his probation to date with the
exception of paying in full the restitution amount. His 36-month probation period is approaching. He has
pending federal charges.
RECOMMENDATION: It is recommended by Adult Probation and Parole that an Order To Show
Cause Hearing be conducted at the Courts convenience.
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Under these specific circumstances, due pro
cess does not mandate that the violation re
port should have been sent to Byington before the hearing or that he must have been
given additional time to review the report a1
the hearing. Thus, Byington's du< pron-x
claim fails.
.

CONCLUSION

The record establishes that Byington fairly
understood the nature of the probation revocation hearing and that counsel would be
appointed for him if he chose. These basic
understandings are enough to render Byington's waiver of his statutory right to counsel
sufficient under the circumstances. Further,
Byington has not demonstrated how his
hearing was fundamentally unfair based on
the fact that the violation report was not
provided to him beforehand. We therefore
affirm the trial court's revocation of Byington's probation.
JACKSON and ORME, JJ., concur.

mining whether defendant's notice of appeal
was timely filed,
Affirmed.

Mi aia :.ot applj in
determining whether defendant's notice of
appeal was timely filed under rule requiring
notice of appeal to be filed within 30 days;
motion was filed when district court clerk
received notice, not when it was delivered to
prison authorities. Rules App.Proc, Rule
4(a).
'. , ' :.
Terence Lee Parker, West Jordan, Pro Se.
Jan Graham and Thomas B. Brunker, Salt
Lake City, for Plaintiff and Appellee.
Before W1LK i .N. -. A^M K:. ,. • < ;
BILLINGS and <».Mr M

BILL
Defendant Terence L. Parker seeks reversal of our prior ruling dismissing his appeal
for lack of jurisdiction because his notice of
appeal was filed with the district court clerk
more than thirty days after entry of judgment. After considering his .petition for rehearing, we dismiss defendant's appeal

STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Terence L. PARKER, ivtendant
ar»d Appellant.
No 1f!07:^-CA

Court of Appeals of \ Ttah.
April 10, 1997.
Defendant was convicted in the District
• • d, Salt Lake Department, Tyrone Medof attempted burglary, and he appealed. The Court of Appeals dismissed defen^r,'' c appeal as untimely, and defendant
virion for rehearing. On rehearing
of Appeals, Billings, J., held that
• ^v>rv rule did. not apply * -M- -

FACTS
Defendant pleaded guilty to attempted
burglary. The trial court held the plea in
abeyance pending defendant's compliance
with certain conditions. Defendant failed to
comply with one condition, and the trial court
ruled that defendant had violated the terms
of the plea-in-abeyance agreement and accepted defendant's guilty plea. Defendant
was incarcerated at the Utah State Prison.
The trial court entered its judgment on
October 25, 1994. Defendant dated his notice of appeal November 18, 1994, and certified that he mailed the notice through the
prison mail on November 19, 1994. The
district court clerk did not date stamp his
notice of appeal until nine days later—November 28,. 1994, With the notice of appeal.

STATE v. PARKER
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defendant included a Motion for Extension
dated November 19, 1994, which also was
date stamped on November 28, but the trial
court never acted on the motion.
Defendant timely filed with this court his
Docketing Statement on December 21, 1994,
and his brief on July 21, 1995. On September 13, 1995, the State moved, under Utah
Rule of Appellate Procedure 10, to dismiss
defendant's appeal for lack of jurisdiction
because he filed his notice of appeal one day
after the time limit.1 This court dismissed
defendant's appeal in an unpublished memorandum decision on October 19, 1995, concluding this court lacked jurisdiction to extend the time for filing a notice of appeal.
Defendant then filed a petition for rehearing, which this court granted. This court
ordered the case remanded to the trial court
for a ruling on defendant's timely motion to
extend the time for appeal. On remand, the
trial court denied defendant's motion to extend the time for appeal. Based on the trial
court's denial of the motion, this court ordered plenary consideration of the issue now
before us: Whether the "prison delivery
rule" should be adopted and applied to interpret Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, thereby making defendant's appeal timely.
ANALYSIS
Defendant argues this court should not
have dismissed his appeal as untimely because we should adopt the "prison delivery
rule," articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S.
266, 108 S.Ct 2379, 101 L.Ed.2d 245 (1988),
to interpret our state rules of appellate procedure. In response, the State argues we
have already rejected the prison deliveryrule in State v. Palmer, 111 P.2d 521 (Utah
CtA.pp.1989) (per curiam).
1. Defendant's notice of appeal was due on Friday, November 25, 1994, which makes the date
his notice was filed, Monday, November 28,
1994, one day past the thirty-day limit provided
by Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 4
2.

Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(1)
(amended 1993) provided.

In Palmer, this court summarily dismissed, in a per curiam opinion, a pro se
prisoner's appeal because his notice of appeal
was filed more than thirty days after entry of
judgment See id at 523 (per curiam). The
Palmer court concluded "the notice of appeal
was not timely filed under any plausible interpretation of our rules." Id. at 522 (per
curiam). The court reasoned that Rule 4
provides that a notice of appeal must be
"filed" with the trial court, and that "[t]o hold
that filing in the trial court is complete upon
mailing is inconsistent" with the plain language of Rule 4. Id. (per curiam). However, the Palmer court did not discuss nor
mention Houston's prison delivery rule.
Therefore, we take this opportunity to specifically consider whether Houston 's prison delivery rule should be adopted in Utah,
In Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 268-69,
108 S.Ct. 2379, 2381, 101 L.Ed.2d 245 (1988),
a pro se prisoner sought appellate review of
a federal district court judgment dismissing
his pro se habeas corpus petition. The prisoner deposited his notice of appeal with prison authorities three days before the deadline,
but the notice was not filed by the district
court clerk until one day after the deadline.
See id. The United States Supreme Court
held that an incarcerated pro se prisoner's
notice of appeal was timely filed when the
prisoner delivered it to prison authorities for
forwarding to the district court clerk within
the thirty-day period required by Federal
Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(1). See id.
At the time of Houston, Federal Rule of
Appellate Procedure 4(a)(1) was nearly identical to the current version of Utah Rule of
Appellate Procedure 4(a).2 See Houston, 487
U.S. at 276,108 S.Ct. at 2385.
Because Houston was an interpretation of
the federal rules, we are not bound by its
holding. However, most states have considered Houston to be persuasive authority.
See, e.g., Mayer v. State, 184 Ariz. 242, 908
In a civil case in which an appeal is permitted
by law as of right from a district court to a
court of appeals the notice of appeal required
by Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the
district court within 30 days after the date of
entry of the judgment or order appealed
from

"*™
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P.2d 56, 53 (Ct.App.1995); Commonwealth v.
Hartsgrove, 407 Mass. 441, 553 N.E^d 1299,
1302 (1990); Hickey v. Oregon State Penitentiary, 127 OrApp. 727, 874 V2i 102, 105
(1994). Similarly, in construing other procedural rules, Utah courts have recognized that
when the Utah rule "is essentially similar" to
the federal rule of procedure, "in addition to
applicable Utah cases, we look to the abundant federal experience in the area for guidance." Landes u Capital City Bank, 795
P.2d 1127, 1130 (Utah 1990); see also Miller
v. Brocksmith, 825 P.2d 690, 693 (Utah Ct.
App.1992) (recognizing when a federal and
state rule of procedure "are substantively
identical, *we freely refer to authorities which
have interpreted the federal rule'" (quoting
Gold Standard, Inc. v, American Barrick
Resources Corp., 805 P.2d 164, 168 (Utah
1990))); State v. Pearson, 818 P.2d 581, 583
(Utah Ct.App.1991) ("While this issue is one
of first impression in this state, it has been
addressed by the federal courts. We may
look to federal cases in interpreting the rules
when the Utah and, federal rales are identical.").

ga% 788 P.2d 491 , 500 (Utah. 19891 iy.^
curiam) ("Unambiguous language in the ST.I
ute may not be interpreted to contradir i.-.
plain meaning."); Allred v. Utah Stau. • >
tirement BdL, 914 P.2d 1172, 1175 (Utah O .
App.1996) (concluding that "[u]nless statutory language is 'unreasonably confused, inoperable, []or in blatant contradiction to the
express purpose of the statute,' this conr*
applies the statute's literal wording" (citato*omitted) (alteration in original)), The-we decline to stretch the plain meaning of
Rule 4 to encompass the prison delivery rule.

Our approach, is consistent with thai tak^.
by other states faced with this issue, in
Talley v. Diesslin, 908 P.2d 1173, 1175 (Colo.
Ct.App.1995), the Colorado Court of Appeals
refused to adopt the prison delivery rule in a
case involving the timeliness of a prisoner's
pro se complaint filed in district court, which
sought review of a Department of Correction's disciplinary order. The court reasoned
that if "the provision of the rule under consideration is unambiguous, we must apply the
plain meaning rule of statutory construction
Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a) and construe the rule as written." Id.
provides:
Therefore, the court concluded, the prison
In a case .in. which, an appeal is permitted delivery rule was contrary to the plain Ian
as a matter of right from the trial court to guage of its procedural rule. See id Also,
the appellate court, the notice of appeal in State ex ret Tyler v. Alexander, 52 Ohio
required by rule 3 shall be filed with the St.3d 84, 555 N.E.2d 966, 967 (1990) (per
clerk of the trial court within SO da.,ys after curiam), the Ohio Supreme Court refused to
• date of entry of the judgment or order adopt the prison, delivery rule, concluding the
appealed from.
plain language of " 'filed in the court from
(Emphasis added.)
which the case is appealed'" could not be
The plain language of Rule 4 provides that construed to mean " 'delivered to the prison
an appellant must file his or her notice of mail room,..7"
appeal in the district court within thirty days.
Nevertheless, the reasoning of Houston
When the language of a rule or statute is
and
the policies underlying the prison delivunambiguous, we have consistently held that
ery
rule
are compelling. If we were in a
a court must follow its plain meaning. See
Salt Lake Child & Family Therapy Clinic, position to write appellate procedural rules,
Inc. v. Frederick 890 P.2d 1017, 1020 (Utah we might wel conclude a rule for pro se
1995) ("'When language is clear and unam- prisoners—such as the current Federal Rule
biguous, it must be held to mean what it of Appellate Procedure 4(c). which incorpoexpresses, and no room is left for construc- rates the prison i i i v ^ - r,fi»-3-—inakes
tion.'w (citation omitted)); Bonham v, Mor- sense.
3.

Federal Pule of Appellate procedure 4 was
led in 1993 to reflect the prison delivery
Thus, the prison delivery rule is now firmly
established in the federal system. See Fed,
R-App. P. 4(c) ("If an inmate confined in an

institution files a notice of appeal, in either a civil
case or a criminal case, the notice of appeal is
timely filed if it is deposited in the institution's
internal mail system, on or before the last day for
filing.").
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In holding the filing was timely, the Houston Court emphasized that an incarcerated
pro se defendant's lack of control over the
filing of his or her notice of appeal is unique.
The Court's language is worth quoting at
length:
Such prisoners cannot take steps other
litigants can take to monitor the processing of their notices of appeal and to ensure
that the court clerk receives and stamps
their notices of appeal before the 30 day
deadline. Unlike other litigants, pro se
prisoners cannot personally travel to the
courthouse to see that the notice is
stamped "filed" or to establish the date on
which the court received the notice. Other
litigants may choose to entrust their appeals to the vagaries of the mail and the
clerk's process for stamping incoming papers, but only the pro se prisoner is forced
to do so by his situation. And if other
litigants do choose to use the mail, they
can at least . . . follow [the notice's] progress by calling the court to determine
whether the notice has been received and
stamped, knowing that if the mail goes
awry they can personally deliver notice at
the last moment or that their monitoring
will provide them with evidence to demonstrate either excusable neglect or that the
notice was not stamped on the date the
court received it. Pro se prisoners cannot
take any of these precautions; nor, by
definition, do they have lawyers who can
take these precautions for them. Worse,
the pro se prisoner has no choice but to
entrust the forwarding of his notice of
appeal to prison authorities whom he cannot control or supervise and who may have
every incentive to delay. No matter how
far in advance the pro se prisoner delivers
his notice to prison authorities, he can
4. The states adopting the prison delivery rule
include Alabama, Arizona, California, Florida,
Louisiana, Massachusetts, Nevada, Oklahoma,
and Oregon. See Holland v. State, 621 So.2d
373, 375 (Ala.Crim.App 1993); Mayer v. State,
184 Ariz. 242, 908 P.2d 56, 59 (Ct.App.1995); In
re Jordan, 4 Cal.4th 116, 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 878, 887,
840 P.2d 983, 992 (1992); Haag v State, 591
So.2d 614, 617 (Fla.1992); Tatum v. Lynn, 637
So.2d 796, 799 (La.Ct.App 1994); Commonwealth v. Hartsgrove, 407 Mass. 441, 553 N.E.2d
1299, 1302 (1990); Kellogg v. Journal Communications, 108 Nev. 474, 835 P.2d 12, 13 (1992)

never be sure that it will ultimately get
stamped "filed" on time.
Houston, 487 U.S. at 270-71, 108 S.Ct at
2382.
The Court noted "the rationale for concluding that receipt constitutes filing in the
ordinary civil case is that the appellant has
no control over delays between the court
clerk's receipt and formal filing of the notice." Id at 273, 108 S.Ct. at 2383-84. In
applying that rationale to the context of a pro
se prisoner, the Court concluded the time of
filing should be the moment at which the pro
se prisoner loses control over and contact
with the notice of appeal—i.e., at the moment
of delivery to prison authorities. See id. at
276,108 S.Ct. at 2385.
Unskilled in law, unaided by counsel, and
unable to leave the prison, [a pro se prisoner's! control over the processing of his
notice necessarily ceases as soon as he
hands it over to the only public officials to
whom he has access—the prison authorities.
Id. at 271,108 S.Ct at 2382-83.
Furthermore, the Court recognized that
the rejection of the mailbox delivery rule in
other contexts has been based, m part, on
concerns of uncertainty over when filing occurred. See id. at 275, 108 S.Ct at 2384.
However, in the context of a pro se prisoner,
there is not the same concern because a wellrun prison will invariably keep a log of outgoing mail and/or date stamp the mail it receives from prisoners. Thus, the prison delivery rule is a bright-line rule." 487 U.S. at
275,108 S.Ct. at 2385.
We understand why many of our sister
states have decided to adopt Houston's interpretation of the federal rules to their own
state rules of procedure.4
(per cunam); Woody v State, 833 P.2d 257, 259
(Okl.1992); Hickey v. Oregon State Penitentiary,
127 Or.App. 727, 874 P.2d 102, 104-05 (1994).
The states rejecting the prison delivery rule
include Arkansas, Delaware, Montana, New
York, Ohio, and Pennsylvania. See Key v. State,
297 Ark. I l l , 759 SW.2d 567, 568 (1988) (per
curiam); Can v. State, 554 A.2d 778, 780 (Del
1989) (per curiam); O'Rourke v. State, 782
S.W2d 808, 809 (Mo Ct.App.1990) (per curiam);
Espinal v. State, 159 Misc.2d 1051, 607 N.Y.S.2d
1008 (CtCl 1993); State ex ret Tyler v. Alexander,
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However, we conclude adoption of such a
rule exceeds our authority and should be left
to our supreme court, which has the ultimate
authority for drafting our rules of appellate
procedure. See Talley, 908 P.2d at 1175
(concluding "authority to adopt rules relative
to review of decisions pursuant to [Colorado
rules of procedure] is the sole function of [the
state's] supreme court"); Turner v. Commonwealth, 137 Pa.Cmwlth. 609, 587 A.2d 48,
49 (1991) ("Even if this Court 'wished to
follow Houston, it has no authority to adopt a
rule which is in direct contravention with ':i
state appellate rule], a rule promulgated o,y
our own Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Any
such revision of that rule would have to come
from the court which promulgated it.")-5
52 Ohio St.3d 84, 555 N.E.2d 966, 967 (1990)
(per curiam); Turner v. Commonwealth, 137 Pa.
Cmwlth. 609, 587 A..2d 48, 49 (1991).
5. We note 'that we do not reach 'the issue of
whether our strict application of Rule 4 violates
a pro se prisoner's due process or equal protection rights because these issues have not been
sufficiently briefed and the record before us precludes an adequate exploration of these impor-

CONCLUSION
VvY decline lo adopt Houston's prison delivery rule as it is not consistent with the
plain language of Utah Rule of Appellate
"wcedure 4. Therefore, we affirm our prior
- • iin^r dismissing defendant's appeal for lack

O I KEY NUMBER SYSTEM >

tant issues. See G
<na p 2d
1131, 1132 (Utah l l
„
_ _ . _ , _ 4 1.2d
599, 602 (Utah CtApp.1992). However, we note
that other courts have found application of similar appellate procedural rules violated pro se
prisoners' equal protection rights in certain circumstances. See People v. Slobodion, 30 Cal.2d
362, 181 P.2d 868, 872 (1947); Haag, 591 So 2d
at 617

!
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STATE v. RAWLINGS
Cite as 893 P.2d 1063 (UtahApp. 1995)

1160 (Utah CtApp.1994) (noting the protections of statutes of limitations).
In refusing to allow the revival of timebarred claims through retroactive application
rf extended statutes of limitations, this court
las chosen to follow the majority rule. See,
z.g., Davis & McMillan v. Industrial Acdlent Comm'n, 198 Cal. 631, 246 P. 1046,1048
1926); Corbett u General Eng'g & Mack
?o., 160 Fla. 879, 37 So.2d 161, 162 (1948);
tyitcaufsky v. Hatten, 353 Mo. 94, 182
3.W.2d 86, 104 (1944), overruled on other
irounds, Director of Depl of Revenue v.
°arcels of Land Encumbered with Delinquent Tax Liens, 555 S.W.2d 293, 297 (Mo.
977); Waldrop v. Hodges, 230 N.C. 370, 53
!.E.2d 263, 265 (1949); Dunham v. Davis,
29 S.C. 29, 91 S.E.2d 716, 718-19 (1956).
[T]he great preponderance of authority faors the view that one who has become reused from a demand by the operation of the
tatute of limitations is protected against its
evival by a change in the limitation law." 51
jn.Jur.2d Limitation of Actions § 44 (1970).
accordingly, "after a cause of action has
ecome barred by the statute of limitations
le defendant has a vested right to rely on
tat statute as a defense ... which cannot be
iken away by legislation . . . or by affirmave act, such as lengthening of the limitation
*riod." Id. (emphasis added).
Accordingly, we conclude that as of De»mber 1, 1976, when Roark turned eighteen
sars old, she had one year within which she
mid have brought a claim for assault and
ittery and four years in which to bring her
aim for intentional infliction of emotional
stress. Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-12-25(3),
!9(4). Any claims arising out of the alleged
xual abuse had to be filed no later than
member 1, 1980. Roark failed to do so.
>nsequently, her claims are barred by the
en-applicable statutes of limitations. Beuse applying section 78-12-25.1 retroacely to the present claim would affect Crabse's vested right to a defense of statute of
litations, the effects of this section are not
irely procedural, and therefore, this secn cannot be applied retroactively.
CONCLUSION
3n the basis of the foregoing, we hold that
i trial court correctly concluded that (1)

any and all causes of action which Roark may
have had were time barred no later than
December 1, 1980, and (2) Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-12-25.1 cannot be applied retroactively
to revive Roark's time-barred claims. Accordingly, we affirm.
ZIMMERMAN, C.J., STEWART,
Associate C.J., and HOWE and DURHAM,
JJ., concur.
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The Fourth District Court, Utah County, Boyd L. Park, J., extended and subsequently revoked defendant's probation. Defendant appealed, and his appeal was consolidated with appeal of district court's denial of
his habeas corpus petition. The Court of
Appeals, 829 P.2d 150, affirmed denial of
habeas petition, and remanded probation revocation order. On remand, the District
Court, Sawaya, J., entered nunc pro tunc
order extending probation, and Park, J., entered nunc pro tunc order revoking defendant's probation. Defendant appealed again.
The Court of Appeals, Davis, Associate P.J.,
held that: (1) defendant was not given proper notice of probation extension proceedings,
and (2) defendant did not waive right to
proper notice of proceedings.
Reversed.
Jackson, J., concurred in result
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1. Constitutional Law <3=>270(5)
Probationer shall be accorded due process at revocation proceedings because revoking probation seriously deprives person of
his or her liberty. U.S.C.A. ConstAmend.
14; U.CA1953, 77-18-1 (1985).
2. Constitutional Law <S=>270(5)
Probationer is accorded measure of due
process at probation extension proceeding
and is thus entitled to available protections.
U.S.C.A- ConstAmend. 14; U.CJL1953, 7718-l(10)(c) (1985).
3. Constitutional Law <sx=>251.6
"Sufficient notice" to satisfy requirements of due process is informing parties of
specific issues which they must prepare to
meet and giving parties reasonable opportunity to know claims of opposing party and to
meet them. U.S.CJL ConstAmend. 14.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and definitions.

4. Constitutional Law <S=>270(5)
Criminal Law <3=>982.7
Casual statement to probationer by aide
at state hospital that extension proceedings
regarding his probation were pending two
days before hearing was not proper notice as
required by due process for extension proceedings to have been properly initiated before original term of probation expired.
U.S.CJL ConstAmend. 14; U.CJL1953, 7718-l(10)(e) (1985).
5. Constitutional Law <3=»251.6
Under due process clause, defendant is
entitled to have adequate notice imparted to
him, that he might make intelligent and informed decision as to whether to waive his or
her constitutional right to hearing. U.S.CA.
ConstAmend. 14.
6. Constitutional Law <3=>43(1)
Criminal Law <e=>982.7
Probationer did not knowingly waive his
due process right to proper notice of issues
before court and right to hearing by giving
consent to extension of probation to judge
after arriving at courthouse after hearing
and receiving advice from former counsel,
where probationer was not advised that for-

mer counsel had begin working as prosecuting attorney, of effects of extension, of any
possible alternatives, that he had right to
proper notice of hearing, that he had right to
hearing on matter, or that state failed to
comply with probation extension statute.
U.S.CA ConstAmend. 14; U.CJL1953, 7718-l(10)(c) (1985).
7. Criminal Law <s*979(2)
Trial court lost jurisdiction to initiate
probation extension proceedings against probationer upon expiration of probation.
U.S.CA ConstAmend. 14; U.CJL1953, 7718-l(10)(c) (1985).

Steven B. Killpack, Margaret P. Lindsay
(argued), Utah County Public Defender
Ass'n, Provo, for appellant
Todd A. Utzinger (argued), Asst Atty.
Gen., Jan Graham, State Atty. Gen., Salt
Lake City, for appellee.
Before BILLINGS, Associate P.J., and
DAVIS and JACKSON, JJ.
OPINION
DAVIS, Associate Presiding Judge:
Defendant Rex Rawlings is before this
court for the second time. Defendant is
again appealing the trial court's initial order
extending defendant's probation and its subsequent order revoking defendant's probation and is consequently challenging the postremand proceedings. We reverse.
FACTS
On October 11, 1985, defendant pled guilty
to a single count of attempted sodomy on a
child, a first-degree felony, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-403.1 (1985). Defendant was sentenced to five years to life in
the Utah State Prison and placed on 18
months probation. A condition of defendant's probation was that he "enter and complete the long-term sex offender program
[program] at the Utah State Hospital." If
defendant failed to complete the program,
"then execution [would] enter on the prison
sentence." Defendant also signed a proba-
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i agreement with Adult Probation & Pas (AP & P) which included the condition
t he complete the "sex offender program."
roughout those proceedings, defendant
3 represented by Sherry Ragan, a public
ender. Although Ragan subsequently
inged positions from public defender to
inty prosecutor after the sentencing pro•dings were completed, she never with>w as defendant's counsel.
Defendant's probation was to expire by
^ration of law 1 on May 6, 1987. On or
rat April 13, 1987, AP & P generated a
)artmental memorandum directed to the
d court which stated that defendant "has
>gressed favorably in the program, but . . .
ids to continue in treatment" 2 AP & P
ommended that the court extend defenit's probation for an additional 18 months
that he could complete the program. No
tion was filed or made by the court or
>secutor to extend defendant's probation.3
wever, the court was apparently made
are of the recommendation and a hearing
s scheduled for April 17, 1987.4 Defenit received nothing in writing of any na•e from any source and learned of the
aring when advised thereof casually by a
spital aide two days before the hearing
,e.
\t the hearing (which was characterized
the court as a "review"), Ragan appeared
counsel for the State; defendant was neiUtah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (10)(a) (Supp 1985)
irovided that "[u]pon completion without vioialon of 18 months probation in felony
cases,
. . the offender shall be terminated from senence." Id.
The memorandum did not comply with Utah
:ode Ann § 77-18-1 (10)(b) (Supp.1985), which
•rovided that "[t]he Department of Corrections
hall notify the sentencing court in writing 30
'ays in advance in all cases where termination of
upervision will occur by law." Id. (emphasis
dded). The memorandum was filed less than
hirty days before the expiration of defendant's
probation and also failed to inform the court that
lefendant's probation period was about to termitate by operation of law.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(10)(c) (Supp.1985)
•rovided that "[a]t any time prior to the termiLation of probation the court may, after a hearcig with proper notice, upon its own motion or
he motion of the prosecutor, extend probation for

ther present nor represented by counsel.
Ragan did not inform the court that she had
initially represented the defendant at his sentencing proceedings. Some time after the
proceedings had terminated, Ragan met defendant in the hall, told him the matter had
already been heard and that his probation
had been extended. Defendant claims that
he asked Ragan whether the extension was
in his best interest and she replied that it
was.5 Ragan then proceeded to escort defendant into the courtroom to speak to Judge
Park 6 and, in reliance on Ragan's advice,
defendant acquiesced to the extension. The
following minute entry, dated April 17, 1987,
was made by the trial court:
This matter came before the Court for
review. Sherry Ragan, appeared as counsel for the State of Utah. The defendant
was not present nor represented by counsel.
The Court reviewed the recommendation
of Adult Probation and Parole Dept. requesting defendant's probation [be] extended for eighteen months in order for
defendant to complete the Utah State Hospital Sex Offender Program. Court so
ordered.
Later, Defendant appeared and concurred with the court's order.
Several months after his original term of
probation would have expired, defendant
good cause shown." Id. (emphasis added).
Rule 12 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
requires that any motion "other than one made
during a trial or hearing shall be in writing
unless the court otherwise permits." In the case
at bar, there was no motion, written or otherwise, filed or made to extend defendant's probation, nor is there anything in the record to suggest that the court's permission was obtained to
waive die motion requirement.
4. The April 13, 1987 memorandum from AP & P
was not filed until April 21, 1987 The record
does not reveal how the court received the recommendation from AP & P.
5. Ragan does not deny making this statement,
but only states that she does not remember making it.
6. Whether defendant actually spoke with Judge
Park or the courtroom clerk is a contested issue.
There is no transcript of what occurred.
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twice appeared before the trial court 7 at
which time the court admonished defendant
for violating the program rules and ordered
that defendant remain in and cooperate with
the program,8 On March 15, 1988, AP & P
filed a motion for an order to show cause,
accompanied by an affidavit, requesting that
the court require defendant to show why his
probation should not be revoked. The affidavit alleged that defendant had violated the
conditions of his probation by not completing
the program and, on this basis, the court
should revoke defendant's probation and impose the prison sentence. The order was
issued by the trial court and the record
reflects that defendant was properly served.
A hearing on the order to show cause was
held June 3, 1988. Defendant was present
with counsel. Because defendant had failed
to complete the program at the Utah State
Hospital, a condition of his probation, the
trial court ordered on July 8, 1988 that defendant's probation be revoked and that his
original sentence be imposed. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court lacked
jurisdiction to revoke his probation because
of procedural defects in his probation extension proceedings. However, because the trial court's minute entry extending defendant's
probation was unsigned, this court in State v.
Rowlings, 829 P.2d 150,153 (Utah App.1992),
determined that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the issue. Thus, the case was remanded for further proceedings to address both
the propriety of the extension proceedings
and the trial court's resulting jurisdiction
over the revocation proceedings.
On remand, evidentiary hearings on the
propriety of the extension proceedings were
commenced before Judge Park 9 and concluded before Judge Sawaya.10 Judge Sawaya
found that, while it was unclear whether
defendant was notified in writing, defendant

knew of the April 17, 1987 extension hearing
and its purpose11 and, therefore, had adequate and proper notice. Judge Sawaya further concluded that, based on defendant's
need for additional time to complete the longterm sex offender program, a requirement of
his probation, the court had good cause to
extend defendant's probation. Thus, Judge
Sawaya entered a nunc pro tunc order dated
May 25, 1993 extending defendant's probation.12
Defendant's probation revocation proceedings were then returned to Judge Park so
that the court could enter findings of fact and
conclusions of law in support of the probation
revocation order. Judge Park found that
defendant had willfully violated the rules of
the program and, hence, willfully violated the
requirement of his probation agreement. As
a result, a nunc pro tunc order dated February 3, 1994 was entered by Judge Park revoking defendant's probation.
Defendant appeals both the propriety of
the original extension proceedings and the
subsequent revocation proceedings.
ISSUE
Although defendant raises several issues
on appeal, we need reach only one: whether
defendant's probation was properly extended
on April 17, 1987, or whether defendant's
probation had expired on May 6, 1987, leaving the trial court without jurisdiction to
revoke defendant's probation on July 8, 1988
or conduct any further proceedings in an
effort to remedy errors.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Whether the trial court had the authority
to extend defendant's probation is a question
of law. "[W]e accord a trial court's conclu-

7. The dates of these hearings were November 6,
1987 and February 5, 1988.

respect to the April 17, 1987 extension proceedings.

8. At these proceedings, defendant was represented by his new attorney, Gary Weight

11. The record of defendant's May 18, 1993 extension hearing supports a finding that defendant
knew of the purpose of the hearing only after its
conclusion and his discussion with Ragan.

9. The date of this hearing was February 12,
1993
10. Judge Park recused himself when it was determined that he may be called as a witness with

12. The "extension" hearing before Judge Sawaya
was held on May 18, 1993, over six years from
the date of the original extension proceedings.
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>ns of law no particular deference, reviews' them for correctness." State v Wilcox,
8 P.2d 1028, 1031 (Utah 1991).
ANALYSIS
Defendant claims that the trial court
jked the authority to extend his probation
cause the April 17, 1987 proceedings were
t conducted in accordance with the provi>ns of Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (Supp.
85), and in particular, because he was not
ran proper notice of the hearing.13 The
ate responds that defendant received adeate notice of the extension proceedings
d, therefore, no procedural defects were
esent which would have rendered the April
, 1987 hearing ineffectual. The State condes, however, that had defendant not reived proper notice of the hearing, the excision proceedings were not "properly initisd prior to the end of his probation [and,
erefore,] defendant would . . . be[ ] entitled
a reversal of the 1988 order revoking his
obation on the ground that the district
urt lacked jurisdiction over the matter."
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the assistance of counsel. Forgues v. United
States, 636 F.2d 1125, 1127 (6th Cir.1980);
United States v. Cornwell, 625 F.2d 686, 689
(5th Cir.1980), cert, denied Cornwell II v.
U.S., 449 U.S. 1066, 101 S.Ct 794, 66
L.Ed.2d 610 (1980); Skipworth v. United
States, 508 F.2d 598, 602-03 (3d Cir.1975).
But see United States v. Carey, 565 F.2d 545,
547 (8th Cir.1977), cert denied 435 U.S. 953,
98 S.Ct. 1582, 55 L.Ed.2d 803 (1978).

[2] We hold that a probationer in the
State of Utah is accorded a measure of due
process at a probation extension proceeding
and is thus entitled to the available protections. The language contained in section 7718-1 provides that "[a]t any time prior to the
termination of probation the court may, after
a hearing with proper notice, . . . extend
probation for good cause shown." Utah
Code Ann. § 77-18-l(10)(c) (Supp.1985) (emphasis added). Thus, section 77-18-l(10)(c)
creates an expectation on behalf of the probationer of notice of the extension proceedings and a hearing, and it is this statutory
expectation to which due process protections
[1] It is well settled that a probationer attach. See Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482
all be accorded due process at revocation U.S. 369, 381, 107 S.Ct. 2415, 2422, 96
oceedings because revoking probation seri- L.Ed.2d 303 (1987); Greenholtz v. Inmates of
sly deprives a person of his or her liberty. Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex,
ignon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782, 93 442 U.S. 1, 11-12, 99 S.Ct. 2100, 2106, 60
Ct 1756, 1759-60, 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973); L.Ed.2d 668 (1979); cf Hatch v. Deland, 790
nith v. Cook, 803 P.2d 788, 795 (Utah 1990); P.2d 49, 51 (Utah App.1990), abrogated on
ate v. Bonza, 106 Utah 553, 150 P.2d 970, other grounds by Labrum v. Board of Par2 (Utah 1944). What is less clear is wheth- dons, 870 P.2d 902 (Utah 1993).
due process attaches to probation exten>n proceedings. Some courts have held,
In Smith v. Cook, 803 P.2d 788 (Utah
thout reference to any statutory law, that 1990), the Utah Supreme Court addressed an
te process protections do not attach to pro- issue analogous to the one before this court
ition extension proceedings. Even so, be- in the context of a revocation proceeding. In
use of the high risk of prejudice to the Smith, the plaintiff was convicted of forcible
obationer when he or she is not given sodomy upon a child and was sentenced to a
ttice of the extension hearing and the hear- prison term of five years to life. Execution
g is conducted ex parte, these courts have of the sentence was suspended, however, and
yoked their supervisory powers requiring the plaintiff was placed on three years probae necessary parties to (1) give the proba- tion. Three months before his probation ex>ner notice of the extension hearing; (2) pired, the plaintiff was again arrested and
tvise the probationer that he or she has a charged with two counts of sexual abuse of a
?ht to a hearing; and/or (3) advise the child and sodomy upon a child. As a result
obationer that he or she has the right to of this arrest, an incident report and "affida• Defendant also claims that the trial court
lacked the authority to extend his probation
based on the absence of a proper motion before

the court, based on our holding, however, we
need not separately address this issue.
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vit to show cause" why the plaintiffs probation should not be revoked were filed with
the court before the expiration of the defendant's probation. However, the court did not
order the plaintiff to show cause why his
probation should not be revoked until after
the plaintiffs original term of probation had
expired. Thus, the plaintiff was first given
notice of the probation revocation proceedings after his probation had expired. At the
hearing on the order to show cause, the
plaintiffs probation was revoked and the
prison sentence imposed. Id at 789.
The plaintiff filed a petition for habeas
corpus and argued that the trial court did not
have the jurisdiction to revoke his probation
because, ltbj the express terms of his probation order, his probation terminated prior to
the time revocation proceedings were initiated." Id. at 793. Thus, the supreme court
addressed the issue of "whether probation
can be revoked when the revocation proceeding had been arguably initiated but not completed before the expiration of a judicially
imposed probation period." Id
The court held that trial courts are not
statutorily required to complete revocation
proceedings before the expiration of the probation period. Id at 794. The court reasoned that allowing revocation proceedings to
continue after the expiration of the probation
period when the proceedings are properly
initiated does not subject probationers to the
"danger of placing them 'in a state of perpetual limbo[, where] although their probation
would appear to have terminated . . . defendants would actually be subject to a continued term of fictional supervision/ " Id at
795 (quoting State v. Green, 757 P.2d 462, 464
(Utah 1988)). The court then addressed the
related issue of "which stage in the revocation proceedings must be reached within the
period of probation for the court to retain its
authority over probationers beyond the probation period." Id. at 794.
The court in Smith began its analysis by
looking at the applicable statutory law. The
plaintiffs revocation proceedings were governed by Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(5)(a)
(Supp.1981), which provided that probation
may not be revoked "except upon a hearing
in court and a finding that the conditions of

probation have been violated." Id Furthermore, "[i]f the court determines that there is
probable cause [to revoke a defendant's probation], it shall cause to be served on the
defendant a copy of the affidavit and an
order to show cause why his probation should
not be revoked or modified." Id § 77-18l(5)(b). Because section. 77-18-l(5)(b) specifically provided that a probationer was to
be served with an order to show cause why
his or her probation should not be revoked or
modified before a court could actually revoke
or modify the probation, the court determined that "in order for a court to retain its
authority over a probationer who is not actively evading supervision, the probationer
must be served with the order to show cause
within the period of probation." Smith, 803
P.2d at 794. The probationer's right to notice is necessary because "all parties concerned would be aware of the proceedings
. . . at the time the probation terminates.
Probationers could also be assured that no
new proceedings or proceedings under different grounds could be brought against them
once the probation period has ended." Id at
795 (footnote omitted). Furthermore, the
court felt that its holding was appropriate
because it "g;uaranteefd1 the fundamental
fairness embodied in the due process rtansp
ot the United States nnnsHfaitfan fwhichl
entitleLs] probationers to written notice of,
the accusations against them." Id at 795.
Kvttll though revocation proceedings were
commenced well before the expiration of probation, because the plaintiff was not given
notice of the revocation proceedings before
the probation period expired, the court held
that the trial, court lacked the authority to
revoke the plaintiffs probation and his petition for habeas corpus was granted. Id at
796.
While Smith involved statutory prerequisites to commencement of a probation revocation proceeding, the same analysis is applicable to statutory prerequisites to commencement of probation extension proceedings. As in Smith, this court must look to
the applicable statute to determine "which
stage in the [extension] proceedings must be
reached within the period of probation for
the court to retain its authority over proba-

STATE v.
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doners beyond the probation
Smith, 803 P.2d at 794.14

period."

At the time relevant to this appeal, the
pertinent parts of section 77-18-1 provided
that
(10)(a) Upon completion without violation of 18 months probation in felony . . .
cases, . . . the offender shall be terminated
from sentence, unless the person is earlier
terminated by the court
(b) The Department of Corrections shall
notify the sentencing court in writing 30
days in advance in all cases where termination of supervision will occur by law.
The notification shall include a probation
progress report
(c) At any time prior to the termination
of probation the court may, after a hearing
with proper notice, upon its own motion or
the motion of the prosecutor, extend probation for good cause shown, for one additional term of 18 months
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (Supp.1985).
Thus, among other things, section 77-181(10) specifically provides that the probationer is entitled to proper notice of the extension proceedings and a hearing before the
court has the authority to extend probation.
If no such notice is given and a hearing held,
the court lacks the authority to extend the
probation period because the trial court's
discretion to extend probation "must be exercised within the limits imposed by the legislature." Smith, 803 P.2d at 791.
"Timely and adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard in a meaningful way are
the very heart of procedural fairness." Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207, 1211 (Utah
1983) (citations omitted); accord Plumb v.
State, 809 P.2d 734, 743 (Utah 1990); W. &
G. Co. v. Redevelopment Agency, 802 P.2d
755, 761 (Utah App.1990). "[A]U parties are
entitled to notice that a particular issue is
being considered by a court and to an opportunity to present evidence and argument on
that issue before decision." Plumb, 809 P.2d
at 743. A defendant may be denied his or
her right to due process under article I,
14. Although additional time to complete the program is an adequate basis for extension of proba-
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section 7, of the Utah Constitution if adequate notice has not been given. Id.; see
also Nelson, 669 P.2d at 1212 (notice is " '[a]n
elementary and fundamental requirement of
due process'") (quoting Mvllane v. Central
Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306,
314, 70 S.Ct. 652, 657, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950)).
" * "Many cases have held that where notice
is ambiguous or inadequate to inform a party
of the nature of the proceedings against him
[or her] or not given sufficiently in advance
of the proceeding to permit preparation, a
party is deprived of due process."'" Plumb,
809 P.2d at 743 (quoting Cornish Town v.
Roller, 798 P.2d 753, 756 (Utah 1990) (quoting Nelson, 669 P.2d at 1212)); accord W. &
G. Co., 802 P2d at 762.
[3] Sufficient notice is informing a party
"of the specific issues which they must prepare to meet" and giving the party a " 'reasonable opportunity to know the claims of the
opposing party and to meet them.'" W. &
G. Co., 802 P.2d at 761 (emphasis added)
(citations and quotation omitted). The Utah
Supreme Court has set forth the well-established requirements of adequate notice:
"[N]otice [must be] reasonably calculated,
under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the
action and afford them an opportunity to
present their objections. The notice must
be of such nature as reasonably to convey
the required information, and it must afford a reasonable time for those interested
to make their appearance."
Nelson, 669 P.2d at 1212 (quoting Mullane,
339 U.S. at 314, 70 S.Ct. at 657).
[4] In the case at bar, the uncontroverted
evidence shows that defendant was not given
proper notice of the extension proceedings.
Defendant informally learned of the hearing
through an aide at the Utah State Hospital,
who apprised defendant wa couple of days
before [he] was supposed to be there" that he
needed to go to the courthouse for a "probation hearing," and that he was to go to Judge
tion, it is noteworthy that, unlike the probationer
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BaHif s courtroom at 10:00 a.m.15 At no time
was defendant informed of the issues which
were scheduled to be heard at the extension
proceedings so that he could prepare to address them. We conclude that a casual
statement to a defendant two days before a
hearing is inadequate to reach the level of
"proper notice" as contemplated by section
77-18-l(10)(c).16
Notwithstanding the impropriety of the
prehearing notice, the State suggests that, to
the extent defendant was entitled to and
denied due process, the events that occurred
after the hearing constituted a consent to the
proceedings and waiver of any due process
claim, and that all of the events through
defendants meeting with Judge Park constituted proper commencement of the extension
proceedings.
[5] It is true that a defendant may waive
his or her constitutional right to due process.
However, "[u]nder the due process clause, [a
defendant is] entitled to have [adequate notice] imparted to him [or her]; that he [or
she] might make an intelligent and informed
decision as to whether to waive his [or her]
constitutional right to a . . . hearing." WorraU u Ogden City Fire Dep% 616 P.2d 598,
602 (Utah 1980). Thus, in order for defendant to have effectively waived his due process right to proper notice and a hearing on
the extension issues, the waiver must be
knowing.
[6] When defendant arrived at the courthouse for the hearing, he met Ragan, whom
he still believed to be his counsel. Ragan
informed defendant that the proceedings had
in Smith, Rawlings was not in default under the
terms of the probation agreement.
15. Which was partially incorrect. The proceedings were actually before Judge Park, not before
Judge Ballif.
16. We note that an amendment to § 77-18-1,
effective April 27, 1987, provided that before
probation could be extended, the probationer
was entided to a minimum of five days notice.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(7)(c) (1987). It could
be argued, therefore, that because the amendment is procedural in nature, it can be applied
retroactively, hence applying to the case at hand.
See Smith v. Cook, 803 P.2d 788, 792 (Utah
1990).

been completed and that his probation had
been extended. Defendant testified that he
asked Ragan if the extension was in his best
interest and Ragan replied that it was. Ragan testified that she merely accompanied
defendant into the courtroom to meet with
Judge Park. Judge Park had no independent recollection of the event. Ragan escorted defendant back into the courtroom, where
either the court clerk or the judge received
defendant's consent to the extension. Although Judge Sawaya made no specific finding, it can be reasonably inferred that defendant's consent to the extension was the result
of either his confidence in, or the advice of,
Ragan, the State's attorney with interests
adverse to those of defendant. At no time
was defendant advised of (1) the fact that
Ragan represented the State and no longer
represented defendant; (2) the effects of the
extension; (3) the available alternatives, if
any; (4) the fact that he had a right to
proper notice of the hearing; (5) the fact that
he had a light to a hearing on the matter; or
(6) the failure of the State to otherwise comply with the provisions of section 77-18-1.
Based on these circumstances surrounding
defendant's consent to the extension, it cannot be said that he knowingly waived his due
process right to proper notice of the issues
before the court and the right to a hearing.
[7] Of course the State could have
remedied the defective proceedings by later
properly commencing proceedings under section 77-18-1, see State v. Jameson, 800 P.2d
798, 802 (Utah 1990), as it purported to do
some six years after the fact.17 However, in
17. Relying on State v. Jameson, 800 P 2d 798
(Utah 1990), the State contends that defendant
received proper notice of the April 17, 1987
hearing and that any procedural defects were
remedied by the 1993 hearings before Judge Sawaya and Judge Park. Although the holding in
Jameson seems to support the State's argument,
it is facmally distinguishable from the case at
hand. In Jameson, the defendant was taken into
custody for violating the terms of his probation
before the probation period expired. Id. at 803.
At the time the defendant was taken mto custody,
section 77-18-1(1 l)(a) provided that "[a]ny time
spent in confinement awaiting a hearing or decision concerning revocation of probation does not
constitute service of the term of probation except
in the case of exoneration at the hearing." Utah
Code Ann. § 77-18-1(1 l)(a) (Supp 1985) Thus,
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accordance with the holding in Smith, a court
loses jurisdiction over a probationer when
probation extension proceedings are not
properly commenced before the probation
term expires. To properly commence probation extension proceedings, the provisions of
section 77-18-1 must be complied with, particularly, proper notice of the hearing must
be given or waived by the probationer.
Smith, 803 ?2d at 794. Because neither
occurred in this case, the proceedings were
never properly commenced, the trial court
lacked the authority to extend defendant's
probation, and its attempt to do so on April
17, 1987 is null and void. Further, because
the failure to comply with section 77-18-1
and accord defendant due process was not
corrected before defendant's probation expired on May 6, 1987, the trial court lost
jurisdiction over defendant and, therefore,
any subsequent proceedings are also null and
void.18
CONCLUSION
A trial court retains jurisdiction over a
probationer after the probation period expires for the purpose of extension proceedings if the proceedings are properly initiated
before the probation period expires. In the
case at bar, in order for extension proceedings to have been properly initiated, Utah
Code Ann. § 77-18-l(10)(e) (Supp.1985) requires, among other things, that the probationer be given "proper notice." Proper notice means informing a probationer of the
issues which will be addressed at the extension hearing and giving the probationer adequate time to address them. Because defendant was not given proper notice of the probation extension hearing before the probation period expired and his subsequent meeting with the trial judge did not constitute a
the defendant's probation had not expired by
operation of law, but was suspended when he
was taken into custody, and it was for this reason
that the court retained its jurisdiction over the
defendant, not, as the State suggests, because the
revocation proceedings were initiated before the
expiration of the probation period. Any question
of the trial court's jurisdiction to revoke probation after the probation period expires was initially and explicidy addressed in Cook, and it is
that case upon which we rely.

knowing waiver of this due process right, the
trial court lacked the authority to extend
defendant's probation. Further, because the
defects were not corrected before defendant's probation expired, the trial court lost
jurisdiction over defendant to conduct any
future hearings. Accordingly, we reverse
both the 1988 and 1994 orders revoking defendant's probation and conclude that defendant's probation expired on May 6, 1987.
BILLINGS, J., concurs.
JACKSON, J., concurs in result
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John DISTON, Plaintiff, Appellee
and Cross-Appellant,
v.
ENVIROPAK MEDICAL PRODUCTS,
INC. a Utah corporation, et aL, Defendants, Appellants and Cross-Appellees,
No. 940062-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
March 27, 1995.

Prospective employee brought action
against company to enforce alleged employment agreement to hire employee, entered
into with company official. The District
Court, Salt Lake County, David E. Roth and
Frank G. Noel, JJ., found for employee and
18. A "nunc pro tunc" extension hearing conducted approximately six years after the defective
proceedings raises due process concerns independent of the 1987 events. See State v. Taylor,
818 P.2d 1030, 1032 (Utah 1991) ("substantial
lapse of time may raise due process concerns"),
cert, denied, Taylor v. Utah, 503 U.S. 966, 112
S.Ct 1576, 118 L.Ed.2d 219 (1992); cf. State v.
Kahl, 814 P.2d 1151, 1153 (Utah App.1991) (revocation proceedings must be brought within a
reasonable time), cert denied, 843 P.2d 516 (Utah
1992). Because of our holding, however, we
need not reach the issue.
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I hold that Lopes was not denied any
jnental rights. I would affirm.
3 Chief Justice HOWE concurs in JusLUSSON'S dissenting opinion.
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tTE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
e J. CALL, Defendant and Appellant.

ceedings prior to that date, as probationer
had actual notice that his term of probation
would not expire at conclusion of statutory
36-month period.
U.CA1953, 77-18K12)(a)(i).
3. Criminal Law <3=>982.7
Probationer knowingly, intelligently, and
voluntarily waived his right to hearing on
issue of whether his probation should be
extended by signing waiver form that informed him of his right to appear and to be
represented by counsel, as defendant was
competent, read from, able to read form, and
had reasonable understanding of proceedings. U.CJU953, 77-18-l(12)(a)(i).

No. 980047.
Supreme Court of Utah.
April 30, 1999.
rhe District Court, Salt Lake Division,
k G. Noel, J., revoked probationer's pron for violation occurring after probation
been extended. Probationer appealed.
Court of Appeals certified case. The
erne Court, Howe, C.J., held that: (1)
ation was properly extended by probafs agreement to one-year extension and
sr of personal appearance well before
•ation date, and (2) waiver was knowing)luntarily and intelligently made.
Affirmed.
riminal Law <s=>982.7
To extend probationary period beyond
riginai term, State must take definitive
n to extend term before the expiration
, and probationer must be given notice of
intent U.C.A.1953, 77-18-l(12)(a)(i).

Jan Graham, Att'y Gen., Barnard N. Madsen, Asst. Att'y Gen., Salt Lake City, for
plaintiff.
Joan C. Watt, Scott C. Williams, Salt Lake
City, for defendant
HOWE, Chief Justice:
f 1 Defendant Leslie J. Call appealed to
the Utah Court of Appeals from a district
court order revoking his probation and ordering him to serve his sentence of two concurrent prison terms. However, after oral
argument, but before rendering a decision,
the court of appeals certified it to us pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(3) and rule
43 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.

BACKGROUND

riminal Law <s=>982.7
Probation was properly extended by
ationer's agreement to one-year extenand waiver of personal appearance on
tision well before expiration date, even
gh State did not initiate extension pro-

H 2 On November 15, 1991, Call pleaded
gwlty to one count of burglary and one count
of attempted forcible sexual abuse, both third
degree felonies. The trial court sentenced
him to serve two concurrent terms of zero to
five years in prison but then suspended his
sentence and placed him on probation for a
period of three years. Although the court
orally sentenced Call on April 3, 1992, it did
not enter the written judgment and sentence
until April 8,1992.1

he parties disagree on the date when Call's
>bation began Call asserts that it began on
nl 3, 1992, the day the court orally sentenced
n. The State, however, relies on State v.

Anderson, 797 P.2d 1114 (Utah Ct.App.1990), to
argue that Call's probationary period did not
begin until April 8, 1992, the day the court
signed and entered the written judgment.
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f 3 One of the terms of Call's probation
required him to enter and complete a sex
offender treatment program. He entered
such a program but was unable to complete it
by April 1995 when his probation would have
initially terminated. On March 20, 1995, at
the request of his probation officer, Call
signed a "Waiver of Personal Appearance
Before the Court," wherein he waived his
right to a hearing and agreed to extend his
probation for one more year so that he could
complete his treatment program. See Utah
Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (12)(a)(i). On April 5,
1995, the Utah State Department of Corrections, Adult Probation and Parole ("AP & P")
filed the signed waiver and a progress/violation report with the trial court and formally
requested a one-year extension of Call's probation. The court granted the extension that
same day.
114 Shortly after the extension of Call's
probation, AP & P filed a second progress/violation report with the court which alleged
that Call had been arrested and charged with
residential burglary, criminal mischief, and
assault. These charges arose from an incident in which Call allegedly broke into his
ex-girlfriend's home, smashed several pieces
of property, and physically assaulted her
thirteen-year-old son. On April 28, 1995, the
court revoked Call's probation but then reinstated it for another year with additional
conditions.
15 On March 28, 1996, AP & P filed a
third progress/violation report with the court.
Although the report alleged that Call had
violated his probation by failing to enter
aftercare for the purpose of monitoring his
ingestion of antabuse, failing to report to AP
& P for one month, resuming to live with his
ex-girlfriend, and consuming alcohol, it did
not seek a revocation of his probation. Rather, the report requested a second extension
of Call's probation so that he could complete
his sex offender treatment program. In addition to the progress/violation report, AP &
P filed a waiver of personal appearance that
Call had signed, wherein he again waived his
right to a hearing and requested another
extension of his probation. The court granted the request and extended Call's probation
for one more year.

f 6 In July 1996, AP & P filed a fourth
progressAiolation report with the court
This report alleged that Call had been arrested and charged with sexual abuse of a
child, intoxication, and interfering with an
arresting officer. The victim's father had
reported to police that he found Call naked
from the waist down and in bed with the twoyear-old victim. In light of these allegations,
the court issued a bench warrant and an
order to show cause, ordering Call to appear
and show why his probation should not be
revoked.
117 While the hearing on the order to
show cause was pending, Call moved to dismiss. He asserted for the first time that the
court's "jurisdiction over [his] case terminated on April 3,1995," two days before AP & P
sought to extend it the first time by filing the
progressAiolation report and signed waiver
of personal appearance with the court on
April 5, 1995. He maintained that the court
therefore lacked the authority to revoke his
probation and that the court should dismiss
the pending revocation proceedings. The trial court denied the motion and ultimately
revoked Call's probation on December 11,
1996. CaJl now appeals.
118 Call contends that "[pjursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (Supp.1996), felony probation terminates by [operation ofl law
after 36 months unless the probation period
is tolled or the trial court acts to extend
probation during the probation period." He
relies on the following subsections, which
provide in relevant part:
(10)(a)(i) Probation may be terminated
at any time at the discretion of the court
or upon completion without violation of 36
months [of] probation
(H)(1)) The running of the probation period is tolled upon the filing of a violation
report with the court alleging a violation of
the terms and conditions of probation or
upon the issuance of an order to show
cause or warrant by the court
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(10)(a)(i) &
(ll)(b). Call argues that since AP & P failed
to file the progress/violation report or otherwise initiate the extension proceedings prior
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ril 3,1995, his probation period was not
but terminated as a matter of law.
so contends that he did not "knowingly,
gently and voluntarily waive his right
hearing on the issue of whether [his]
ttion should be extended." He thus
ides that even if AP & P had filed the
r and progress/violation report before
jobation terminated, the waiver was
theless ineffective in extending his proi. We will consider these two contenin order.
ANALYSIS
Over the past eleven years, we have
•ccasion to decide two significant cases
ig with the termination of probation.
i first case, State v. Green, 757 P.2d 462
i 1988), we held that the trial court did
ave authority to revoke a defendant's
tion after the probationary period had
3d by operation of law pursuant to secr7-18-l(10)(a), which at that time profor automatic termination of probation
eighteen months with no probation vio. In that case, after the eighteen1 probationary period had expired, a
tion officer discovered that the defenwas being charged with committing
offenses during the eighteen-month
jory term of his probation. The officer
an affidavit of probation violation with
ial court, and after a hearing, the court
ed the defendant to serve a prison term
s original conviction. We reversed the
sending him to prison and pointed out
idefiniteness the trial court's ruling creendants would be left in a perpetual
£ of limbo; although their probation
ild appear to have been terminated,
ally by entry of an order to that effect,
endants would actually be subject to a
tinued term of fictional supervision .
iades could pass and then, based upon
discovery of a probation violation
ch had occurred during the statutory
iod, a court could revoke a term of
bation thought to have been terminated
?ago.
464.

) Two years later, in Smith v. Cook,
•2d 788 (Utah 1990), the defendant was

on probation for a three-year period, starting
on July 10, 1981, and ending July 9, 1984.
Three months prior to the completion of his
probation, the defendant was again arrested
and charged with a crime. On May 15, 1984,
an incident report and affidavit to show cause
why his 1981 probation should not be revoked or modified was filed in the district
court Five months later, in December 1984,
the court revoked his probation and ordered
him to serve his sentence. We reversed the
revocation, holding that in order for a trial
court to retain its authority over the probationer beyond the period of probation, the
probationer must be served with an order to
show cause within the probationary period.
See Smith, 803 P.2d at 796.
[1, 2]

H 11 These rases ^str-j^t that if it

is the intent, nf tfrp fttate tn eyf-end the probationary period bevond its original term, the
State must take definitive action to extend
the term before the expiration date, and the
probationer must be given notice of that
intent. Otherwise, the probationer is left in
a state of uncertainty, not knowing whether
to continue to observe the terms of his probation. In the instant case, a probation officer approached Call well in advance of the
termination date and requested that he agree
to a one-year extension of his probation so
that he could complete the sex offender
treatment program in which he was enrolled,
thus fulfilling one of the terms of his probation. On March 20,1995, Call signed a waiver of personal appearance, wherein he waived
his right to a hearing and agreed to an
extension of his probation for one more year.
This action confirmed that Call received actual notice that his term of probation would not
expire at the conclusion of the statutory 36month period. Thus Call's probation was
properly extended under section 77-18l(12)(a)(i), which provides: "Probation may
not be modified or extended except upon
waiver of a hearing by the probationer or
upon a hearing and a finding in court that
the probationer has violated the conditions of
probation." (Emphasis added.)
112 We conclude that Call acted to extend his probation for one year well in advance of the expiration of the original term
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and left him with no doubt that he remained wa£ competent, and understood and could
obligated to the terms of his probation for read the document that he signed. The trial
another year. See State v. Martin, 976 P.2d court did not err in this regard.
1224 (Utah CtApp.1999) (holding that under
115 We conclude that the record fully
section 77-18-1 (12)(a)(i), probation may be supports that Call knowingly, intelligently,
extended in either of two ways provided for and voluntarily waived his right to a hearing
in that subsection). Since Call signed the on the issue of whether liis probation should
written waiver well before both April 3,1995, be extended. This conclusion is bolstered by
and April 8, 1995, it is immaterial for the the fact that one year later, in March 1996,
purposes of this case on which of those two Call again executed a "Waiver of Personal
dates his original term of probation would Appearance Before the Court" and requested
have expired.
another extension of his probation.
[3] U13 Call also contends that he did
116 Order affirmed.
not "knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily
waive his right to counsel, notice and a hear117 Associate Chief Justice DURHAM,
ing on the extension issue." He has admit- Justice STEWART, Justice ZIMMERMAN,
ted, however, that he signed the waiver and and Justice RUSSON concur in Chief Justice
that he was competent and able to read the HOWE'S opinion.
words on the form before he signed it. Call
did not testify at the hearing on his motion to
dismiss t t e oxter \& stao^ rame 'wrr? VAs
probation should be revoked The record on
this issue consists solely of the uncontradicted testimony of his probation officer and the
written waiver.
1114 The probation officer testified that
on March 20, 1995, he met with Call and
discussed the probation conditions Call had
not met and the possibility of an extension.
Call did not object to extending his probation
and did not ask for an attorney before making that decision. He read the waiver form
and asked no questions before he signed it.
The form stated that Call was willing to
accept the extension of his probation without
a hearing and acknowledged his right to be
present at a hearing and to be represented
by counsel. In State v Byington, 936 P.2d
1112,1116 (Utah CtApp.1997), the court held
that a probationer in a probation revocation
bearing can waive tiie right to counsel "as
long as the record as a whole reflects the
probationer's reasonable understanding of
the proceedings and awareness of the right
to counsel." Under that standard, the written waiver corroborated by both the probation officer's testimony and Call's admission
established that Call had a reasonable understanding of the proceedings and an awareness of his right to counsel. In denying
Call's motion to dismiss, the trial court determined that Call knew what he was signing,
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STARWAYS, INC., Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Wesley D. CURRY and Bobbi Chase, aka
Roberta A Chase, dba Curry & Chase
Marketing, Defendants and Appellants.
No. 980025.
Supreme Court of Utah.
May 18, 1999.
Nevada corporation which had its principal place of business in Utah brought suit
agatfist Canlorma residents ddmg business Y&
California for libel and intentional interference with existing and prospective business
advantage. California residents moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction The
Fourth District Court, Utah County, Fred D.
Howard, J., denied motion, and California
residents took interlocutory appeal The Supreme Court, Durham, Associate Chief
Judge, held that* (1) defendants failed to
specifically controvert jurisdictional allegations of complaint; (2) complaint allegations
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IN THE 3RD DISTRICT - SALT LAKE CITY COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
IN AND FOR THE STATE OF UTAH

CHE STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff,
VS

ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

ORR, David Jay

COURT CASE NO: 001902772
Defendant,

JUDGE: Timothy R-Hanson
DEF ATTY: Larry R. Keller

UPON A READING of the Affidavit in Support of Order to Show Cause, the Court finds
probable cause to believe that the defendant in this matter has violated the terms and conditions
of his/her probation as set forth in the Affidavit, and that revocation or modification of
defendant's probation is justified.
IT IS ORDERED that the defendant appear before the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson,
Judge of the above-entitled Court, at the Judge's courtroom in SALT LAKE, Utah, on the
day of Ijfajt*

2C!^j at the hour of

ff^^then

and there to show cause why probation

of said defendant should -K>t be revoked or modified by the Court based upon the allegations
contained in the Affidavi; on file with the Court.

-E: ORR, David Jay

-2The defendant has arightto be represented by counsel at the above-described hearing and
to have appointed to represent the defendant if the defendant is indigent. The defendant also has
arightto present evidence as provided in the Utaji Rules of Civil Procedure.
DATED THIS

IZJ_ day of

V^UA

20j2."^>

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that this Order to Show Cause and Affidavit in support thereof, was
personally served upon trie defendant at

<^>r\Kr

>lff [A- (tffrf^^jf

.oy showing the

original and informing the defendant of its contents, and delivering a copy on the I^J
MftV

20QJ; additional copies were delivered to /yUftn J^TfMJJt^f \

the defendant, on the _J_ Q

day of

Aljfaf

ROBERT EGEL1

20^J

PROBATION OFFICER

day of

counsel for
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH vs. DAVID J ORR
CASE NUMBER 001902772 State Felony

CHARGES
Charge 1 - 61-1-1 - SECURITIES FRAUD
3rd Degree Felony
Disposition: March 23, 2000 Dismissed
Charge 2 - 61-1-1 - SECURITIES FRAUD
3rd Degree Felony
Disposition: March 23, 2000 Dismissed
Charge 3 - 61-1-1 - SECURITIES FRAUD
2nd Degree Felony
Disposition: March 23, 2000 Dismissed
Charge 4 - 61-1-1 - SECURITIES FRAUD
2nd Degree Felony
Disposition: March 23, 2000 Dismissed
Charge 5 - 61-1-1 - SECURITIES FRAUD
2nd Degree Felony
Disposition: March 23, 2000 Dismissed
Charge 6 - 61-1-1 - SECURITIES FRAUD
2nd Degree Felony
Disposition: March 23, 2000 Dismissed
Charge 7 - 61-1-1 - SECURITIES FRAUD
2nd Degree Felony
Disposition: March 23, 2000 Dismissed
Charge 8 - 61-1-1 - ATTEMPTED SECURITIES FRAUD (amended)
3rd Degree Felony
Plea: March 23, 2000 Guilty
Disposition: March 23, 2000 {Guilty Plea}
Charge 9 - 61-1-1 - SECURITIES FRAUD
2nd Degree Felony
Disposition: March 23, 2000 Dismissed
Charge 10 - 61-1-1 - SECURITIES FRAUD
3rd Degree Felony
Disposition: March 23, 2000 Dismissed
Charge 11 - 61-1-1 - SECURITIES FRAUD
3rd Degree Felony
Disposition: March 23, 2000 Dismissed
Charge 12 - 61-1-1 - SECURITIES FRAUD
3rd Degree Felony
Disposition: March 23, 2000 Dismissed
Charge 13 - 76-10-1801 - COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD
2nd Degree Felony
Disposition: March 23, 2000 Dismissed
Charge 14 - 76-10-1801 - COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD
2nd Degree Felony
Disposition: March 23, 2000 Dismissed
Charge 15 - 61-1-3 - UNREGISTERED SECURITIES AGENT
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3rd Degree Felony
Disposition: March 23, 2000 Dismissed
Charge 16 - 61-1-3 - UNREGISTERED SECURITIES AGENT
3rd Degree Felony
Disposition: March 23, 2000 Dismissed
Charge 17 - 61-1-3 - UNREGISTERED SECURITIES AGENT
3rd Degree Felony
Disposition: March 23, 2000 Dismissed
Charge 18 - 61-1-3 - UNREGISTERED SECURITIES AGENT
3rd Degree Felony
Disposition: March 23, 2000 Dismissed
Charge 19 - 61-1-3 - UNREGISTERED SECURITIES AGENT
3rd Degree Felony
Disposition: March 23, 2000 Dismissed
Charge 20 - 61-1-3 - UNREGISTERED SECURITIES AGENT
3rd Degree Felony
Plea: March 23, 2000 Guilty
Disposition: March 23, 2000 {Guilty Plea}
Charge 21 - 61-1-3 - UNREGISTERED SECURITIES AGENT
3rd Degree Felony
Disposition: March 23, 2000 Dismissed
Charge 22 - 61-1-3 - UNREGISTERED SECURITIES AGENT
3rd Degree Felony
Disposition: March 23, 2000 Dismissed
Charge 23 - 61-1-3 - UNREGISTERED SECURITIES AGENT
3rd Degree Felony
Disposition: March 23, 2000 Dismissed
Charge 24 - 61-1-3 - UNREGISTERED SECURITIES AGENT
3rd Degree Felony
Disposition: March 23, 2000 Dismissed
Charge 25 - 61-1-3 - UNREGISTERED SECURITIES AGENT
3rd Degree Felony
Disposition: March 23, 2000 Dismissed
Charge 26 - 61-1-3 - UNREGISTERED SECURITIES AGENT
3rd Degree Felony
Disposition: March 23, 2000 Dismissed
Charge 27 - 76-10-1603 - PATTERN OF UNLAW ACTIVITY
2nd Degree Felony
Disposition: March 23, 2000 Dismissed
Charge 28 - 7 6-10-1603 - PATTERN OF UNLAW ACTIVITY
2nd Degree Felony
Disposition: March 23, 2000 Dismissed
CURRENT ASSIGNED JUDGE
TIMOTHY R. HANSON
PARTIES
Defendant - DAVID J ORR
Represented by: LARRY R. KELLER
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CASE NUMBER 001902772 State Felony

Plaintiff - STATE OF UTAH
Represented by: HOWARD R LEMCKE
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Defendant Name: DAVID J ORR
Date of Birth: February 27, 1961
Jail Booking Number:
Law Enforcement Agency: SECURITIES DIVISION
LEA Case Number:
Prosecuting Agency: SALT LAKE COUNTY
Agency Case Number: DAO 00003211
Sheriff Office Number:
Violation Date: December 07, 1994 SL COUNTY
ACCOUNT SUMMARY
TOTAL REVENUE

Amount Due:
Amount Paid:
Credit:
Balance:

606.75
606.75
0.00
0.00

REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: FINE
Original Amount Due:
Amended Amount Due:
Amount Paid:
Amount Credit:
Balance:

1,850.00
288.53
288.53
0.00
0.00

Account Adjustments
Date
Amount
Reason
Nov 23, 2002
-1,561.47
Accounts Receivable accounted
for by Adult Probation and Parole. Any outstanding payments
should be made to AP&P.
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: INTEREST
Amount Paid:
Amount Credit:
Balance:
Account Adjustments
Date
Jul 30, 2002
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COP"
Amount Due:
Amount Paid:
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Amount
311.47

311.47
0.00
0.00

Reason
Interest Posted to Date

FEE
6.75
6.75
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Amount Credit:
Balance:

0.00
0.00

CASE NOTE
DAO 00003213
PROCEEDINGS
02-11-00 Case filed
02-11-00 Note: CASE FILED BY DAVID WAYMENT UT DIV OF SECURITIES. DEF
NON-JAIL. WARRANT ACTIVATED.
02-11-00 Warrant ordered on: February 11, 2000 Warrant Num: 972102725
Bail Allowed
50000.00
Bail amount:
02-11-00 Warrant issued on February 11, 2000 Warrant Num: 972102725
Bail Allowed
Bail amount:
50000.00
Judge: PAT B BRIAN
Issue reason Based on the probable cause statement.
02-14-00 Note: deft will surrender with larry keller
02-14-00 SURRENDER scheduled on February 15, 2000 at 09:30 AM in
Arraignment - S31 with Judge ARRAIGNMENT.
02-14-00 Judge ARRAIGNMENT assigned.
02-14-00 ARRAIGNMENT Cancelled.
02-14-00 ARRAIGNMENT scheduled on February 15, 2000 at 09:30 AM in
Arraignment - S31 with Judge ARRAIGNMENT.
02-15-00 ROLL CALL scheduled on March 02, 2000 at 02:00 PM in To Be
Determined with Judge ATHERTON.
02-15-00 Minute Entry - Minutes for Initial Appearance
Judge:
RAYMOND S. UNO
PRESENT
Clerk:
barbarrs
Prosecutor: LEMCKE, HOWARD R
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s
KELLER, LARRY
Video
Tape Number:

73

Tape Count: 900

INITIAL APPEARANCE
Defendant waives reading of Information.
Defendant is arraigned.
ROLL CALL is scheduled.
Date: 03/02/2000
Time: 02:00 p.m.
Location: To Be Determined
Third District Court
450 South State
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Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Before Judge: JUDITH S. ATHERTON
02-15-00 Note: INITIAL APPEARANCE minutes modified.
02-15-00 Warrant recalled on: February 15, 2000 Warrant num: 972102725
Recall reason: Based on Court order
02-15-00 Note: MOTION OF HOWARD LEMCKE FOR STATE COURT ORDER WARRANT
RECALLED. DEFENDANT NOTIFIED AS BY SUMMONS BY NOTIFYING
ATTORNEY LARRY KELLER .
02-15-00 Note: REQUEST OF HOWARD LEMCKE CASE SET ON REGULAR ROLL CALL
AND IF REQUIRED LATER CASE TO BE SET ON SPECIAL SETTING.
02-18-00 Note: Bail remain $250,000
03-02-00 Minute Entry - Minutes for Roll Call
Judge:
RAYMOND S. UNO
PRESENT
Clerk:
terryb
Prosecutor: HOWARD LEMCKE
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): LARRY KELLAR
Interpreter:
Video
Tape Count: off record
HEARING
Roll continued to 3/23 due to Plea Negotiations.
ROLL CALL.
Date: 3/23/2000
Time: 02:00 p.m.
Location: To Be Determined
Third District Court
450 South State
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Before Judge: ROGER A. LIVINGSTON
03-06-00 Note: ROLL CALL calendar modified.
03-06-00 ROLL CALL scheduled on March 23, 2000 at 02:00 PM in To Be
Determined with Judge LIVINGSTON.
03-06-00 Note: JUDGE UNO TOOK THE BENCH FOR JUDGE ATHERTON
03-23-00 Judge HANSON assigned.
03-23-00 SENTENCING scheduled on May 12, 2000 at 09:00 AM in Fourth
Floor - N4 5 with Judge HANSON.
03-23-00 Note: Case Bound Over
03-23-00 Minute Entry - Minutes for Change of Plea
Judge:
ROGER A. LIVINGSTON
PRESENT
Clerk:
terryb
Prosecutor: HOWARD LEMCKE
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): LARRY KELLAR
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Video
Tape Number:

video

Tape Count: 2.37

Defendant waives the reading of the Information.
Court advises defendant of rights and penalties.
Defendant waives time for sentence.
A pre-sentence investigation was ordered.
The Judge orders Adult Probation & Parole to prepare a Pre-sentence
report.
Upon states motion, Amend Count 8 to F3 - Attempted Securities
Fraud. Defendant will plead guilty to amended count and Count 20
as charged. All remaining counts will be dismissed.
CASE BOUNDOVER
Defendant waived preliminary hearing, State consenting thereto.
This case is bound over. A Sentencing has been set on 5/12/00 at
09:00 AM in courtroom N45 before Judge TIMOTHY R. HANSON.
03-23-00 Note: CHANGE OF PLEA minutes modified.
05-12-00 Tracking started for Probation. Review date May 12, 2003.
05-12-00 Fine Account created
Total Due:
1850.00
05-12-00 Minute Entry - Minutes for SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITME
Judge:
TIMOTHY R. HANSON
PRESENT
Clerk:
evelynt
Prosecutor: HOWARD R LEMCKE
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): LARRY R. KELLER
Video
Tape Number:

5/12/00

Tape Count: 9:23/10:09

SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of ATTEMPTED SECURITIES FRAUD a
3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate
term of not to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison.
The prison term is suspended.
Based on the defendant's conviction of UNREGISTERED SECURITIES
AGENT a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an
indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in the Utah State
Prison.
The prison term is suspended.
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE
These sentences are to run consecutively.
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SENTENCE FINE
Charge # 8

Fine:
Suspended:
Surcharge:
Due:

Charge # 20

Fine: $5000.00
Suspended: $4500.00
Surcharge: $425.00
Due: $925.00

Total Fine:
Total Suspended:
Total Surcharge:
Total Principal Due:

$5000.00
$4500.00
$425.00
$925.00

$10000.00
$9000.00
$850.00
$1850.00
Plus Interest

ORDER OF PROBATION
The defendant is placed on probation for 3 year(s).
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation & Parole.
Defendant is to pay a fine of 1850.00 where the surcharge has been
added to the fine. Interest may increase the final amount due.
Pay fine to The Court.
PROBATION CONDITIONS
Usual and ordinary conditions required by the Department of Adult
Probation & Parole,
Violate no laws.
Pay restitution as determined by Probation Officer.
Serve 6 months in the Salt Lake County Jail, as a term of
probation, no credit for time served. Commitment is to issue
forthwith
Restitution is to be determined. Defendant is to pay no less than
$1,000 per month towards restitution, or 25% of income, under
direction of APP. Restitution hearing may be set upon appropriate
application.
Have no contact with victims.
Not be involved in activities in which involves other persons
money, investment, or involving financial account.
06-21-00 Fee Account created
Total Due:
311.47
08-02-00 Filed: Letter to Court from Bruce Bartlett
08-09-00 Filed: Letter from Court dated 8/8/00 to Bruce Bartlett
09-05-00 Filed: Memo from Bruce Bartlett to Court re: defendant, date
mailed 8/14/00
09-13-00 Filed: Letter to Mr. & Mrs Ward from the Court, dated 9/12/00
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09-13-00 Filed: Letter to court from Wards, dated 8/31/2000

12-05- 00 Filed: Letter to Court from Thomas J. Million, D.M.D.
12-13- 00 Filed: Letter to Dr. Million from Court
01-02- 01 ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE scheduled on January 12, 2001 at 09:00 AM
in Fourth Floor - N4 5 with Judge HANSON.
01-02-01 Filed order: Progress/violation report: Approved and Ordered:
OSC shall issue probation violation
Judge thanson
Signed January 02, 2001
01-02- 01 Filed: Affidavit in support of OSC
01-02- 01 Issued: Order to Show Cause
Judge TIMOTHY R. HANSON
Hearing Date: January 02, 2001
Time: 09:00
01-10-01 Filed: Motion for Discovery
01-10-01 Filed: Motion for More Definite Statement or in the Alternative
Motion for Bill of Particulars and Motion to Strike
01-10- 01 Filed: Memorandum m Support of Motion for More Definite
Statement or in the Alternative Motion for Bill of Particulars
and Motion to Strike
01-12- 01 ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE scheduled on January 26, 2001 at 09 00 AM
in Fourth Floor - N4 5 with Judge HANSON.
01-12- 01 Minute Entry - Minutes for Law & Motion
Judge:
TIMOTHY R. HANSON
PRESENT
Clerk:
kathrygw
Prosecutor: HOWARD R LEMCKE
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): LARRY R. KELLER
Video
Tape Number:

1/12/01

Tape Count: 9:57/10:04

HEARING
This matter is re-set as indicated herein on Defendant's Motion.
APP is to provide a more specifLC statement and names of witnesses
to the defendant.
Copy to counsel, APP
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE is scheduled.
Date: 01/26/2001
Time: 09:00 a.m.
Location: Fourth Floor - N4 5
THIRD DISTRICT COURT
4 50 SOUTH STATE
SLC, UT 84111-1860
Before Judge: TIMOTHY R. HANSON
01-17-01 Filed order: Order granting defendant's motion for billof
particulars
Judge thanson
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Signed January 17, 2001
01-17-01 Filed order: Order granting defendant's motio for discovery

Judge thanson
Signed January 17, 2001
01-22-01 Filed: Certificate of Service (deffs motion for discovery and
order granting def's motion for bill of particulars)
01-26-01 EVIDENTIARY HEARING scheduled on February 16, 2001 at 02:00 PM
in Fourth Floor - N4 5 with Judge HANSON.
01-26-01 Minute Entry - Minutes for ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE
Judge:
TIMOTHY R. HANSON
PRESENT
Clerk:
kathrygw
Prosecutor: JOY ONTON
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): LARRY R. KELLER
Video
Tape Number:

1/26/01

Tape Count: 9:05/9:08

HEARING
The Defendant denies the 2 allegations in the Order to Show Cause.
This matter is set for evidentiary hearing as indicated herein.
Copy to counsel/APP
Martene Mackay is present on behalf of APP.
EVIDENTIARY HEARING is scheduled.
Date: 02/16/2001
Time: 02:00 p.m.
Location: Fourth Floor - N45
THIRD DISTRICT COURT
4 50 SOUTH STATE
SLC, UT 84111-1860
Before Judge: TIMOTHY R. HANSON
01-30-01 Filed order: Progress/violation report- Hearing set (1/26/01)
to address probation violations
Judge thanson
Signed January 30, 2001
02-16-01 Minute Entry - Minutes for Order to Show Cause
Judge:
TIMOTHY R. HANSON
PRESENT
Clerk:
evelynt
Prosecutor: LEMCKE, HOWARD R
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): KELLER, LARRY R.
Video
Tape Number:

2/16/01

Tape Count: 2:21/2:40

HEARING
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This matter is before the Court for evidentiary hearing regarding
probation violation. Counsel appearing as shown above. APP is

present, (Danny Platis ?)
Counsel advise the Court that they have reached a resolution in
the matter. Based on the agreement, the Court will dismiss the
OSC, subject to:
1. Counsel/APP, providing the Court with information regarding
the status of the trust fund.
2. Amounts still owed to victims, how much has been paid, and to
whom.
The State has until 6/1/01 to provide the Court with the
information. Probation will not terminate pending restitution
being satisfied.
The Court clarifies the probation condition regarding defendant's
handling other persons funds.
Defendant is not be be involved in activities that involves other
persons money, investments, or involving financial accounts.
02-16-01 Note: ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE minutes modified.
03-09-01 Filed order: Supplemental Order of the Court and Dismissal of
revised Order to Show CAUSE DATED 1/2/01
Judge thanson
Signed March 09, 2001
03-14-01 Filed: Letter to Court form Thomas J. Million, D.M.D. (cc:
APPD)
05-31-01 Filed: Motion to Enter Partial Restitution Order and Motion to
Extend Time to Compelte Restitution Order
06-05-01 Filed order: Partial restitution order and additional order of
the Court
Judge thanson
Signed June 05, 2001
06-08-01 Filed: Copy of letter from DOC (APP) to Larry Keller
07-31-01 Filed: Motion to Enter Final Restitution Order
08-01-01 Filed order: Final Restitution Order of the Court
Judge thanson
Signed August 01, 2001
08-02-01 Judgment #1 Entered
Debtor:
DAVID J ORR
Creditor: KURT OSTLER
30,000.00 restitution
Debtor:
DAVID J ORR
Creditor: JEFF OSTLER
30,000.00 restitution
Creditor: CRAIG GRENIER
Debtor:
DAVID J ORR
50,000.00 restitution
110,000.00 Judgment Grand Total
08-02-01 Filed: Final Restitution Order of the Court @J
09-18-01 Filed: Letter to court from Thomas J. Million D.M.D., dated
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8/13/01
09-18-01 Filed: Ct f s M.E: setting scheduling conferene to determine
restitution amount againt defendant
09-18-01 Notice - NOTICE for Case 001902772 ID 921966

CONFERENCE RE: RESTITUTION is scheduled.
Date: 10/12/2001
Time: 02:00 p.m.
Location: Fourth Floor - N45
THIRD DISTRICT COURT
4 50 SOUTH STATE
SLC, UT 84111-1860
Before Judge: TIMOTHY R. HANSON
Scheduling conference, see Court's minute entry
09-18-01 CONFERENCE RE: RESTITUTION scheduled on October 12, 2001 at
02:00 PM in Fourth Floor - N4 5 with Judge HANSON.
10-12-01 Filed: Accounting records, etc.,
10-12-01 Minute Entry - Minutes for MINUTE ENTRY
Judge:
TIMOTHY R. HANSON
PRESENT
Clerk:
evelynt
Prosecutor: LEMCKE, HOWARD R
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): KELLER, LARRY R.
Video
Tape Number:

10/12/01

Tape Count: 2:20/2:33

HEARING
This case is before the Court for scheduling conference.
Defendant and Counsel are present. Robert Egelund (APP) is
present, and Dr. Thomas J. Million, D.M.D.
Discussion is had, and the restitution hearing is set as indicated
herein.
The only issue to be considered, is Dr. Million's claim.
RESTITUTION HEARING is scheduled.
Date: 01/31/2002
Time: 10:00 a.m.
Location: Fourth Floor - N45
THIRD DISTRICT COURT
4 50 SOUTH STATE
SLC, UT 84111-1860
Before Judge: TIMOTHY R. HANSON
The foregoing dates should be considered firm settings and will not
be modified without court order, and then only upon a showing of
manifest injustice. Counsel are instructed to stay in contact with
the Clerk as the trial date approaches regarding dates.
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10-12-01 RESTITUTION HEARING scheduled on January 31, 2002 at 10:00 AM
in Fourth Floor - N4 5 with Judge HANSON.
01-31-02 Minute Entry - Minutes for MINUTE ENTRY
Judge:
TIMOTHY R. HANSON
PRESENT

Clerk:
evelynt
Prosecutor: LEMCKE, HOWARD R
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): KELLER, LARRY R.
Video
Tape Number:

1/31/02

Tape Count: 10:21/1:25

HEARING
This case is before the Court for restitution hearing. Defendant
is present, and counsel appearing as shown above.
Counsel present no opening statements.
COUNT: 10:22
Dr. Thomas Jackson Million is sworn and examined on behalf of the
State.
COUNT: 11:14
Defendant, David J. Orr is sworn and examined, called by the
State.
COUNT: 11:30
The State rest.
COUNT: 11:31
Quinn Howe is sworn and examined on behalf of defendant.
COUNT: 12:03
Defendant rest.
Counsel present closing arguments.
COUNT: 12:15
Lunch Recess to 1:00 p.m.
COUNT: 1:11
The Court determies that the restitution owed to victim,, Dr.
Thomas Million, is $255,504.39. This amount may be off-set by any
amount received from case before Judge Nehring #010901021.
The Clerk of Court will hold Stocks in question, subject to
further order of distribution by the Court.
Anyone wanting to buy the Stock is to petition the Court in
writing, with detailed amount buyer is willing to pay.
Mr. Lemcke is to prepare appropriate documentation regarding the
hearing today.
01-31-02 Notice - Final Exhibit List
01-31-02 Note: MINUTE ENTRY minutes modified.
03-07-02 Fee Account created
Total Due:
6.75
03-07-02 COPY FEE
Payment Received:
6.75
04-30-02 Fine
Payment Received:
110.87
Note: Mail Payment;
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04-30-02 INTEREST
Payment Received:
279.13
05-14-02 Filed: Letter from Dr. Million, to Court w/attached
documentsdated 5/6/02
05-21-02 Fine
Payment Received:
42.33
Note: Mail Payment;
05-21-02 INTEREST
Payment Received:
7.67

06-04-02 Filed: Letter to Dr. Million from the Court, cc: counsel
07-01-02 Filed order: Progress/violation report: Approved & Ordered:
Defendant remains on probation as ordered
Judge thanson
Signed July 01, 2002
07-02-02 Fine
Payment Received:
50.00
Note: Mail Payment;
07-30-02 Fine
Payment Received:
85.33
Note: Mail Payment;
07-30-02 INTEREST
Payment Received:
24.67
11-23-02 Note: Accounts Receivable accounted for by Adult Probation and
Parole. Any outstanding payments should be made to AP&P.
05-05-03 Filed: Letter to the Court from Thomas J. Million
05-13-03 Filed order: Progress/violation report; OSC to be set
Judge thanson
Signed May 13, 2003
05-13-03 Filed: Affidavit in support of OSC
05-13-03 ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE scheduled on May 30, 2003 at 09:00 AM in
Fourth Floor - N4 5 with Judge HANSON.
05-13-03 Filed: Faxed documents from APP
05-23-03 Filed: Motion to Dismiss Order to Show Cause for Lack of
Jurisdiction
05-23-03 Filed: Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss Order to Show
Cause for Lack of Jurisdiction
05-27-03 Filed: Letter to Thomas J. Million from the Court
05-30-03 Minute Entry - Minutes for Law and Motion
Judge:
TIMOTHY R. HANSON
PRESENT
Clerk:
evelynt
Prosecutor: BERNARDS-GOODMAN, KATHERINE
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): KELLER, LARRY R.
Video
Tape Number:

5/30/03

Tape Count: 9:25

HEARING
Defendant's motion to dismiss is argued, and the court allows the
State to respond to the motion. State is to file their response by
6/13/03.
Any final reply is due by 6/20/03.
Hearing on the motion is set as indicated herein.
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cc: counsel/app
MOTION TO DISMISS is scheduled.
Date: 06/23/2003
Time: 11:00 a.m.
Location: Fourth Floor - N45
THIRD DISTRICT COURT
4 50 SOUTH STATE

SLC, UT 84114-1860
Before Judge: TIMOTHY R. HANSON
06-02-03 MOTION TO DISMISS scheduled on June 23, 2003 at 11:00 AM in
Fourth Floor - N4 5 with Judge HANSON.
06-20-03 Filed: Memo to the Court from APP
06-23-03 Minute Entry - Minutes for Law and Motion
Judge:
TIMOTHY R. HANSON
PRESENT
Clerk:
evelynt
Prosecutor: LEMCKE, HOWARD R
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): KELLER, LARRY R.
Video
Tape Number:

6/23/03

Tape Count: 11:25/12:10

HEARING
This matter is before the Court for oral argument regarding
defendant's motion to dismiss, on basis of lost jurisdiction.
Appearances as shown above. Robert Egelund appearing on behalf of
APP.
Counsel present arguments to the Court,
robert Egelund is sworn and examined.
Counsel present closing arguments. The matter is submitted.
Based upon the foregoing, the Court denies the defendant's motion
to dismiss.
The defendant is ordered to satusfy the May & June restitution
payments within 30 days.
The Court will issue a formal Order regarding the hearing today,
and in so doing, will determine the appropriate time to extend the
probation period.
06-23-03 Notice - Final Exhibit List
07-02-03 Filed order: Memorandum Decision and Order (def's motion to
dismiss denied; probation extended to the remaining term of his
sentence - 10 years)
Judge thanson
Signed July 02, 2003
07-09-03 Filed: Notice of Appeal
07-14-03 Note: Forwarded Cert/Copy of Notice of Appeal to Court of
Appeals
07-15-03 Filed order: Progress/violation report: Approved & Ordered:
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Probation reduced to an amt approved by APPD, either side may
request hearing if dispute
Judge thanson
Signed July 15, 2003
07-16-03 Filed: Transcript of OSC hearing dated June 23, 2003, Beverly
Lowe, CCT
07-17-03 Filed: Letter from Court of Appeals - Noa received, Court of
Appeals No. 20030574-ca

07-31-03 Filed order: Progress/violation report; Court Update
Judge thanson
Signed July 31, 2003
09-08-03 Filed: Letter to Court from Thomas Million, D.M.D.
09-24-03 Filed: Motion for Issuance of Certificate of Probable Cause and
Request for Oral Argument
09-24-03 Filed: Ex Parte Motion for Leave to File Over-Length Memroandum
09-24-03 Filed: Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion for
Certificate of Probable Cause and Motion for Stay of Execution
10-01-03 Minute Entry - Minutes for MINUTE ENTRY
Judge:
TIMOTHY R. HANSON
Clerk:
evelynt
HEARING
The Court has received and reviewed the defendant's motion for
Certificate of Probable Cause.
The Court sets the matter for oral argument for October 14, 2003,
at 9:00 A.M.
Counsel for the State is to file any reply memorandum no later
than 5 working days prior to hearing.
The Court has set this matter for a 30 minute setting.
10-01-03 MOTION HEARING scheduled on October 14, 2003 at 09:00 AM in
Fourth Floor - N4 5 with Judge HANSON.
10-09-03 Filed: Joint and Stipulated Motion to Continue
10-14-03 MOTION HEARING Cancelled.
Reason: ATD requested continuance.
10-14-03 ORAL ARGUMENT scheduled on November 20, 2003 at 09:00 AM in
Fourth Floor - N4 5 with Judge HANSON.
10-14-03 Filed order: Order on Joint Motion to continue hearin gon
defendant's motion for certificte of probable cause
Judge thanson
Signed October 14, 2003
10-23-03 Note: Indexed - record forwarded to Court of Appeals (2 files,
1 transcript, 2 envelopes exhibits)
11-17-03 Filed: Letter dated 11/10/03 to the Court from Dr. Saeed
Ghaderi
11-20-03 Minute Entry - Minutes for INCOURT NOTE
Judge:
TIMOTHY R. HANSON
PRESENT
Clerk:
kathrygw
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Prosecutor: LEMCKE, HOWARD R
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): KELLER, LARRY R.
Video
Tape Number:

11/20/03

Tape Count: 9:04/9:14

This matter is before the Court on Defendant's Motion for
Certificate of Probable Cause. The Court heard argument and based

thereon, the motion is denied. This Minute Entry will stand as the
Court's Order.
11-26-03 Filed: **UNSIGNED** order denying defendant's request for
certification of probable cause filed unsigned; order (11/20/03
M.E.) already entered
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